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99TH CONGRESS
2d Session
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT
99-474

ORIGINAL

SUPPORTING THE CONTADORA PROCESS

REPORT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ON

H. Con. Res. 283

FEBRUARY 26, 1986.—Referred to the House Calendar, and ordered to be printed

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Mr. BARNES, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany H. Con. Res. 283]

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 283) to reaffirm support for the agreement on a framework for negotiating a peaceful settlement to the conflict and turmoil in Central America, which resulted from the initiative of the Contadora group, having considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend that the concurrent resolution do pass.

SUMMARY

House Concurrent Resolution 283 (1) reaffirms the support of the Congress for the Contadora initiatives and the resulting Document of Objectives, which sets forth a framework for negotiating a peaceful settlement to the conflict and turmoil in the region, and international reconciliation and democracy within Nicaragua; (2) affirms the support of the Congress for the Caraballeda Message Towards Central America's Peace, Security and Democracy, which seeks peaceful solutions to the conflicts in the region; and (3) reaffirms the belief of the Congress that the United States should provide such assistance and support as may be appropriate in helping to reach final agreements based on the goals of the Document of Objectives and the Caraballeda Message.

COMMITTEE ACTION

House Concurrent Resolution 283 was introduced on February 6, 1986, by the Honorable Mel Levine, with bipartisan cosponsorship. On February 20, the resolution was considered and ordered favorably reported by the Committee on Foreign Affairs by unanimous voice vote.

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Oversight Findings and Recommendations

House Concurrent Resolution 283 is the result of extensive hearings and oversight activity, including study missions to Central America, by members and staff of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs.

Background

The following section sets forth the history of the Contadora process and the relevant Contadora documents. The first part, which provides an historical and analytic review, is a CRS issue brief entitled, "The Contadora Initiative: Implications for Congress," by Nina M. Serafino of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of the Congressional Research Service, dated February 3, 1986.[1] The second part presents six documents: The initial Contadora accord, known as the "Contadora 21 Points," put forward September 9, 1983, by the governments of the four Contadora countries of Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, and Panama and later consented to by the five Central American countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua; the January 1984 "Panama Resolution," setting forth principles for implementation of the commitments of the Document of Objectives, adopted by all nine countries; the fourth and latest draft of the Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America, drafted by the four Contadora countries; the "Carabellada Message Towards Central America's Peace, Security, and Democracy," issued January 12, 1986, by the four Contadora countries and by the four group of support countries of Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay and agreed to by the five Central American countries on January 14 in the "Declaration of Guatemala;" and "Communique Issued by the Members of the Contadora Group and the Group of Support After Meeting with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz," February 10, 1986.

I. History of the Contadora Process[2]

Issue Definition

In January 1983, the foreign ministers of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama met on Contadora Island, off the Pacific coast of Panama, to consider means to resolve conflicts in Central America. Their particular concern was to alleviate tensions between Nicaragua and the United States that they feared were turning Central America into a focal point of East-West confrontation. In a process that became known as the "Contadora Initiative," these four states began to mediate disagreements among Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Eventually, the four "Contadora Group" states and the five Central American nations set the ambitious goal of negotiating a comprehensive agreement on Central American political, economic, and security issues.

[1] The CRS issue brief, while deemed to be an accurate depiction of the facts involving the Contadora process, does not necessarily represent the views of the members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

[2] By Nina Serafino, Congressional Research Service.

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In late 1985, the Central American countries began studying the third version of a draft treaty prepared by the Contadora countries. In early December 1985, the Central American countries agreed to postpone discussion on unresolved issues for five months, during which time three new elected govenments would take office in Central America. According to some reports, unresolved issues appear to be arms control and reduction, verification, and military exercises.

Almost since its inception, the multilateral initiative has been strongly favored by some Members of Congress as a peaceful alternative to what they have viewed as a misguided confrontational approach by the Reagan Administration towards U.S. problems in Central America posed by the leftist Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua and the civil conflict in El Salvador. But other members of Congress and the Reagan Administration, while declaring their support for the Contadora Initiative, have stated that U.S. backed military efforts are necessary to protect our allies in the region and strengthen their negotiating position.

In legislation passed in July 1985, Congress approved the expenditure of $2 million by the Secretary of State for implementation expenses if the Central American countries should reach an agreement based on the Contadora Document of Objectives. In considering the situation in Central America and U.S. policy toward Nicaragua, Congress may wish to consider whether the Contadora process merits continued support.

BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS

The background and policy analysis portion is divided into the following sections:

I. Brief History of the Initiative and the U.S. Role
II. Current Status and Key Difficulties
III. Role for Congress and Current Options

Related CRS products are: Issue Brief 84139, U.S. Assistance to the anti-Sandinista Guerrillas; and CRS Report 84-547 F, Status of the Contadora Process, Feb. 24, 1984.

I. Brief history of the initiative and the U.S. role origins, evolution and purposes

The January 1983 meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama was prompted by shared concerns regarding Central America.

Their primary concern was that Central America was increasingly becoming a focal point of East-West tensions. during 1981 and 1982, while Nicaragua acquired Soviet weapons, trained an expanding army with Soviet and Cuban advisers, and provided a conduit for some, albeit debated, degree of Soviet and Cuban assistance to the Salvadoran guerrillas, the United States increased its military presence in Honduras and El Salvador and its rhetoric against the Sandinista government. Officials of the Contadora Group countries particularly feared that if the United States continued to view the problem as primarily a strategic one of denying the Soviet Union a foothold on the mainland of the Western Hemisphere, it would ulti-

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mately respond with unilateral U.S. military action, possibly an invasion of Nicaragua.

At the same time, they judged that U.S. policy in Central America would result in a substantial and prolonged U.S. military presence in the area. In their judgment, this would reassert U.S. dominance and reduce national autonomy in the region, and would strengthen the conservative elites and exacerbate the socio-economic conditions which they perceived as the root cause of conflicts there.

The Contadora Group countries also worried about the escalating domestic conflicts in Nicaragua and El Salvador. They feared that the activities of the reportedly growing numbers of anti-Sandinista guerrillas, based in Honduras and funded by the United States, could provoke a regional war. An apparent radicalization of the Nicaraguan leadership likewise troubled some of the Contadora Group, fearing Sandinista intentions to foment revolution in the region. In El Salvador, many officals from Contadora Group countries felt that U.S. military assistance to the Salvadoran army was designed to secure a military victory over leftist forces, rather than to create conditions for their preferred solution, the left's peaceful reintegration into the Salvadoran political system.

The foreign ministers of the four "Contadora Group" countries first met in Panama with the five Central American foreign ministers in April 1983. Subsequently, these officials established ambitious and compehensive goals in two documents: the October 1983 Document of Objectives and the January 1984 "Panama Resolution," labeled the "principles for the implementation of the commitments of the Documents of Objectives." (Cited and reproduced in CRS Report 84-547 F.) Four different treaties have been proposed during the Contadora process. The Contadora Group submitted the first draft treaty to the Central American countries in mid-1984. Objections led to a revised "Contadora Act on Peace and Cooperation" which was presented on Sept. 7, 1985, to the Central American countries for their "refinements" and signature. Nicaragua announced on Sept. 21, 1984, that it was willing to sign the revised draft treaty, as it was, if the United States would sign an appended protocol pledging to support it. But the other Central American states and the United States had substantial reservations, particularly about the security provisions. On Oct. 20, 1984, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras presented a third proposal, known as the "Act of Tegucigalpa," which reportedly had been drafted in close collaboration with the United States. This was rejected by Nicaragua. Finally, after 10 months of talks and negotiations, the Contadora Group presented on Sept. 12, 1985, a revised draft treaty, which includes compromise language concerning the differing security provisions of the Sept. 7, 1984 and the Oct. 20, 1984 proposals.

Politically, the goals of the Contadora process aim to promote systems of government in the five Central American countries based on democratic and pluralistic principles. Economically, the goals envisage developing Central American economies through mutual efforts and by reviving institutions and mechanisms of regional economic integration.

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Security goals emphasize: (1) ending support for armed insurgencies and arms trafficking in Central America; (2) halting military buildups and reducing the military strength of countries in the area by placing ceilings on the number of troops and arms that each country could possess; and (3) ending the foreign military presence in the region. This last goal was to be reached by gradually reducing the numbers of foreign military advisers until none remained, and by forbidding the establishment in the region of foreign military bases or any other form of foreign military interference.

Some participants in the Contadora meetings, as well as observers, expected that an agreement combining these elements would bring economic gains. Immediate gains would come from reducing high military expenditures and ameliorating civil strife. Longer term gains would ensue from building mechanisms for economic development, stabilization, and regional integration. It was hoped that these results would provide funds for social programs and increase the prospects for political stability. These potential benefits were seen as inducements to overcome continued distrust among Central American governments and prompt them to sign. In particular, some Central American government officials said they feared that Nicaragua would never foreswear spreading revolution and would inevitably violate any treaty that it signed; Nicaragua's Sandinistas fear that the United States and its friends in Central America would try to use the Contadora Initiative to drive them from power.

U.S. role

The United States, as well as Cuba and the Soviet Union, were not directly involved at the start of the Contadora process, but Contadora countries recognized that all were protagonists in the Central American conflicts and would have to support any final accord if it were to last. Some Contadora officials thought that the United States and Cuba might later be brought directly into the negotiations. Many also believed that the United States would have to register clear support for the Contadora process at the outset to convince all Central American parties to negotiate seriously. They thought that the United States would do so because the Contadora objectives parallelled the previous U.S. position on important security matters. As outlined in mid-1982 by Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas O. Enders, the United States proposed that the Central American countries agree to end the export of subversion, to end the regional arms buildup by a commitment by all countries not to bring in specific weapons, and to limit foreign involvement by setting a common ceiling for each country on the number of outside military and security advisers and troops, or perhaps by removing them altogether. These agreements were to be subject to comprehensive verification.

However, the Reagan Administration and the Contadora Group countries differed on some issues, particularly on the situations in El Salvador and Nicaragua. In Nicaragua, the Administration believed substantial pressure including military force was necessary to induce the Sandinistas to broaden political rights and hold fair elections, while some Contadora Group officials cited U.S. pressures

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on Nicaragua as an obstacle to greater pluralism there. In El Salvador, the Administration held that the left should be allowed to participate in elections sponsored by the standing government; Contadora Group officials in general appeared to prefer more accommodation of leftist demands for a change in government, perhaps leading to the establishment of a new, temporary government made up of all groups in conflict to set conditions for fair and free elections.

These differences and the Administration's strong distrust of the Sandinistas appeared to block active U.S. support of the Contadora process through much of 1983, although it gave its verbal backing. In July 1983, President Reagan expressed "strong support" for the Contadora process in a letter to the presidents of the Contadora countries. In it, he wrote he believed "a solution to the crisis in Central America must encompass four basic principles." The first was the establishment and strengthening of democratic institutions to ensure "free and open participation in the democratic process . . ." The others were: respect for non-intervention, including "a ban on support for subversive elements that seek to destabilize other countries;" the removal of the conflict in Central America "from the context of an East-West confrontation, through such measures as a verifiable withdrawal of all foreign military and security advisers and a certifiable freeze on the acquisition of offensive armaments;" and the fostering of economic growth.

An international support and congressional backing for the Contadora Initiative grew and as the initiative began to take form with the adoption of a Document of Objectives in October 1983, the Administration started to actively examine the issues involved in formulating a final treaty. In early 1984, the Administration began to participate actively in the process by proposing verification criteria and procedures. It reportedly offered to fund a major part of verification activities and considered giving substantial financial assistance to help implement economic goals set forth in an agreement, thereby increasing the incentives for countries, particularly Nicaragua, to sign.

Meanwhile, in a related move requested by the Contadora countries and considered vital to the success of the initiative, the United States and Nicaragua in mid-1984 began bilateral talks, most of which took place in Manzanillo, Mexico. Reportedly, the talks centered on the United States and Nicaraguan positions on the Contadora Initiative. They were suspended, after nine rounds, in January 1985. Nicaraguan officials stated they sought these talks to secure a separate U.S. guarantee that the United States would abide by any Contadora document. On the other hand, U.S. officials stated that the talks were broken off because Nicaragua sought a bilateral agreement with the United States on security issues in lieu of a Contadora document. They stated that the United States would resume talks with Nicaragua "if doing so would, in their judgment, contribute to a comprehensive Contadora agreement."

On July 1985, the Foreign Ministers of the Contadora Group countries formally urged the United States and Nicaragua to resume negotiations as one step to help advance the peace process. (In their communique of July 22, the Contadora Foreign Ministers

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also urged the Central American countries to put a brake on the arms race, intimidating acts of force and support for irregular forces. They also stated that the Central American countries should take measures to consolidate and strengthen democratic systems and processes of national reconciliation.) The United States reportedly indicated, however, that it would not resume talks with Nicaragua until that government took steps towards "internal reconciliation," i.e., until the Nicaraguan government began talks with its arms and unarmed opposition.

In view of past criticism that the United States has been an obstacle to the Contadora Initiative because of its objections to certain earlier provisions, U.S. officials now state that the United States is taking no position on the provisions of the September 1985 proposed treaty. Apparently, however, U.S. officials object to the new draft's provisions on military maneuvers.

II. Current status, key provisions and points of disagreement

On Sept. 12, 1985, the Contadora Group presented a newly revised draft treaty to the Central American countries. It contains compromises on the points in dispute between its Sept. 7, 1984 draft and the October 1984 "Act of Tegucigalpa" counterproposal of three Central American countries. A Nov. 20 deadline was set on negotiations leading to signing, but most likely that will be extended.

As of early November 1985, the Costa Rican and Honduran foreign ministers made statements indicating that their countries were willing to sign the September 1985 draft, although it is not clear whether that is an official and final position of their governments. Nicaragua, on the other hand, announced on Nov. 11, 1985 that it had some problems with the document—principally on provisions on military maneuvers and on foreign advisors. In addition, President Daniel Ortega announced that Nicaragua was unwilling to begin negotiations on military reductions called for by the treaty unless the United States made concrete commitments to provide a minimum degree of security for Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan government also desires that certain of the Contadora commitments be implemented before the document is signed, specifically commitments on terrorism, sabotage, subversion, and support for irregular forces.

In early December 1985, the Central American countries agreed to a proposal by Nicaragua to suspend negotiations on the draft treaty until May 1986. Many analysts believe that the postponement signifies a lack of desire by the Central American countries to compromise further in order to reach an agreement. Some believe that Nicaragua suggested the postponement in hopes that it might be able to negotiate what it would view as a more favorable treaty if negotiations resume, as three Central American governments are scheduled to change before May. Newly elected governments in Honduras and Guatemala will be installed in January, and Costa Rica's presidential elections are scheduled for February, with the new government to take office in April.

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General Provisions

The political, economic, and social commitments outlined by the September 1985 version of the draft treaty are almost identical to those of the earlier proposals. Differences in the draft treaties and the current positions of the Central American countries center largely on procedural, implementation, verification, and enforcement matters of the security provisions.

The Contadora process appeared to have been given a new impetus in January 1986, however. On Jan. 12, 1986, the foreign ministers of the four Contadora Group countries and of the four "Support Group" countries (Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay) proposed a formula to break stalemated negotiations. In a declaration signed in Caraballeda, Venezuela, the eight countries called for a climate of mutual trust to be established by the simultaneous execution of nine points.

These are: (1) the conclusion of negotiations aimed at signing the Contadora act; (2) an end to support from abroad for irregular forces [the anti-Sandinista guerrillas]; (3) an end to support for insurrectional movements; (4) a freeze on the purchase and distribution of arms; (5) the suspension of international military maneuvers; (6) the progressive reduction with the aim of eliminating the presence of foreign military advisers and foreign military installations; (7) unilateral declarations of non-aggression by the Central American countries; (8) effective steps toward national reconciliation and the total observance of human rights and individual liberties; and (9) the promotion of regional and international social and economic cooperation.

The Contadora Group and Support Group countries also offered their services as mediators to: (1) promote new national reconciliation measures; (2) encourage acceptance of the Guatemalan President Vinicio Cerezo's proposal to establish a Central American parliament to discuss the regional situation; and (3) encourage the reestablishment of bilateral talks between the United States and Nicaragua.

The foreign ministers of the five Central American countries subsequently endorsed the so-called "Caraballeda" document in a separate statement signed in Guatemala City on Jan. 14, 1986. Two days later, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega issued a separate communique implying that the Nicaraguan government viewed the renewal of conversations between the United States and Nicaragua as a necessary step for Nicaragua to resume negotiations with the other Central American countries under the Contadora initiative.

Thus far, however, under the political provisions, the Central American countries would commit themselves to adopt measures to further the development of representative and pluralist democratic systems, to take specific steps to improve their electoral systems and to ensure honest and periodic elections, and to protect human rights. In countries suffering civil strife, the governments would also promise to take steps to promote national reconciliation, and to create the mechanisms for a dialogue with and amnesty for their opponents.

The economic and social commitments set out provisions covering the protection, support, and voluntary repatriation of refugees.

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The commitments also provided for steps to reactivate and strengthen mechanisms for Central American integration and to improve jointly the region's economic conditions.

The security provisions outline a framework for freezing arms imports, ending international military manuevers, dismantling foreign military bases and schools, and ending arms trafficking and support for armed opposition movements in the region. And the provisions define the conditions for further negotiations to set limits on the levels of arms and of military personnel and installations, and to withdraw foreign advisers.

Key provisions and points of disagreement

The various propose drafts of the Contadora treaty have differed largely on the security provisions. All set forth a framework with the goals of negotiating the level of arms, troops, and military installations, and the extent of foreign military presence. But the specific framework—i.e., the preconditions and timetable for negotiations on these matters—is different in each draft. There have also been differences over verification provisions. These issues are discussed below.

Timing and conditions of negotiations and implementation

The September 1985 draft treaty proposes that a process of negotiations on acceptable levels of military arms, installations, and personnel begin simultaneously upon signature of the document by the five Central American countries. Also upon signature, the Parties are called on to suspend the procurement of war materiel (except spare parts) and to refrain from increasing their military strength until maximum levels of military strength are negotiated.

The formula for establishing limits on military capacity calls for two stages. In the first stage, a Verification and Control Commission (CVC) would receive inventories within 15 days of signature. Within 60 days of signature, the CVC must complete technical studies and suggest to the Parties the maximum levels of permissable military strength, taking into account a variety of criteria. In the second stage, beginning 60 days after signature (i.e., at the same time that the CVC makes its suggestions), the Parties would negotiate, within 30 days, the acceptable levels of military strength. If the Parties failed to establish limits, those suggested by the CVC would prevail until the Parties reach agreement.

In addition, "international" military maneuvers, i.e., maneuvers with the participation of troops with more than one country, would continue on a restricted basis until negotiations were completed on the acceptable levels of troop strength. Apparently, all other commitments would formally take effect upon ratification.

Levels of military strength

The provisions for negotiations on levels of military strength represent a compromise between the September 1984, and the October 1984, drafts, and the stated provisions of the various Central American countries. But they still are not satisfactory to all parties.

Nicaragua apparently would still prefer a formula closer to that set forth in the September 1984 draft. That draft had provided for an indefinite freeze on the acquisition of all military materiel, an

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end to support for insurgent groups, and a halt to joint military even before negotiations on these matters. This provision was maneuvers—designed, according to officials from Contadora Group countries, to reassure Nicaragua that it could participate in talks to limit military strength without jeopardizing its security.

Officials from other Central American countries reportedly felt that arrangement gave Nicaragua an undue advantage. They stated that the arrangement gave Nicaragua what it wanted from a Contadora treaty—principally an end to international military maneuvers and to support for the anti-Sandinista guerrillas—and left them with little incentive to negotiate to reduce levels of arms, foreign advisers, troops, and military installations. Instead, they proposed only a limited arms freeze that would last 60 days, during which would begin a 90-day period for negotiating limits on military capacity. The rest of the commitments were to become binding simultaneously, upon ratification.

The present proposal apparently is still unacceptable to Nicaragua. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega stated on Nov. 11, 1985, that these provisions of the September 1985 draft are unacceptable as long as Nicaragua is under military attack by forces supported by the United States. Nicaragua argues that it cannot agree to reduce arms and troops until U.S. support for the anti-Sandinista guerrillas ends and unless the United States publicly promises not to invade Nicaragua. Specifically, Nicaragua wants the United States to sign a protocol pledging to "cease its aggression in all forms," agree to the commitments on international military maneuvers, and abide by any decision of the International Court regarding the case which Nicaragua has brought there against the United States for its support of the anti-Sandinista guerrillas.

Also, Nicaragua objected to the provisional enactment of CVC limits on arms, troops, and installations if the Parties should fail to negotiate their own limits within a certain period, contending this violated a state's fundamental rights. And it still wants an end to support for insurgent forces as a precondition for negotiations. Nicaragua also protested the September 1985 draft's addition of a moratorium on troop increases to take effect at the same time as the freeze on the acquisition of military materiel, stating it cannot promise to do so if it is still under military attack.

Reportedly, Honduras and El Salvador initially objected to some aspects of provisions for the reduction of arms. It is not clear what the specific objections were, nor whether those countries still find them objectionable.

Level of foreign military presence

The levels of foreign military presence are addressed in provisions on international military maneuvers and on the levels of foreign advisers.

On "international" or joint military maneuvers, the 1985 agreement provides for restrictions until agreement is reached on acceptable levels of military strength. These restrictions call for countries to give advance notice of any international maneuvers, limit them to once a year with the participation of no more than 3,000 troops (of which a majority must be of the host country), and specify that they should not take place within 30 miles of an inter-

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national border. In practical terms, these provisions would severely limit the type of U.S.-Honduras joint maneuvers carried out in the last few years. However, this provision is more lenient than the September 1984 draft, which called for an outright prohibition on such manuevers. It is much stricter than the October 1984 draft, which would have allowed such maneuvers if the Parties gave a 30-day notice before conducting them.

There were some reports in October 1985 that Honduras and possibly El Salvador objected to the provisions providing for the eventual end of "international" maneuvers. It is unclear if this remained an official position as of early 1986.

Nicaragua's current position is that the international maneuvers must be prohibited at the same time that weapons acquisitions are frozen. In addition, Nicaragua wants the United States to be prohibited from conducting unilateral maneuvers in the area, which Nicaragua claims are used to intimidate it. Nicaragua is also now proposing that the treaty prohibit foreign troops from ever using Central American territory.

Some U.S. officials have held in the past that the United States must continue to participate in maneuvers in Central America, both because it is a cost-effective way of training Central American troops and because it helps ensure the preparedness of U.S. troops to protect hemisphere security. They have stated that a complete ban on maneuvers is not necessary to reduce tension in the region.

Concerning foreign advisers, the September 1985 draft requires the Parties to withdraw foreign military advisers and personnel capable of participating in military, paramilitary, and security activities with six months of signature. Acceptable levels of foreign advisers "performing technical duties related to the installation and maintenance of military equipment" are to be set, with suggestions from the CVC.

This again is a compromise position. A complete withdrawal of all foreign military advisers was one of the initial objectives of the Contadora initiative. The September 1984 draft had called for the Parties to begin, within 30 days after signature, negotiations to set a timetable for the phased withdrawal "with a view to the removal" of foreign military advisers and other foreign elements. It also called for the immediate withdrawal of any advisers performing operational and training functions, but would allow some reasonable level of advisers performing technical functions related to the installation and maintenance of military equipment.

The October 1984 counterproposal was similar. It called for the Central American countries to develop a schedule within 90 days of signing for the "reduction, with a view to the withdrawal, of foreign military advisers and other foreign personnel capable of participating military, paramilitary, and security activities." There was no provision for the immediate withrawal of advisers; and a temporary ad hoc disarmament body was to set limits for advisers performing technical duties relating to the installation and maintenance of military equipment.

Nicaragua's negotiating position is that all foreign military advisers, including those who exercise technical functions, must be removed. On the other hand, Nicaragua finds unacceptable the provisions that would also remove "foreign elements capable of partici-

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pating in military activities" as vague and ambiguous. Presumably, this was meant to affect its Cuban and Soviet bloc civilian advisors, and other personnel.

Early in 1985, some U.S. officials stated that they would refuse to accept the removal of all U.S. advisers, and wanted a common, low limit set. More recently, other U.S. officials have stated that the United States has no position on the number of advisers. Although some undoubtedly would maintain that the United States must be able to maintain at least some level of military relations traditional between friendly governments.

Other provisions would indirectly affect the level of foreign military presence. A suspension of the acquisition of military materiel and limitations on the Central American arsenals would curb the amount of military aid that the United States, the U.S.S.R., Cuba, and other countries now give to Central American countries. Such limitations would depend on negotiations and on the recommendations of the CVC.

Also, like the September 1984 draft, the 1985 draft calls for the elimination of foreign military bases and installations within 6 months of signature. While it is doubtful that the foreign military bases exist in Central America as defined in an annex to the 1985 draft, military installations primarily for U.S. personnel are in operation in Honduras. Similar Soviet or Cuban operations may exist in Nicaragua as well. The removal of these installations may prove to be objectionable for those sponsors, although no public comment has been reported on the subject.

Nicaragua now also proposes that the Contadora treaty contain a provision prohibiting foreign elements from having access to or participating in any military bases, schools, or installations in the region.

Verification of security provisions

The September 1985 draft responds to many concerns expressed in the October 1984 draft and voiced by the United States. It considerably strengthens the mechanisms for verification. However, many of the specifics on the procedures for verification that has not yet been made public.

Under the September 1985 draft, the main mechanism for insuring compliance with the security commitments is the Commission for Verification and Control in Security Matters (CVC). It would have the power to examine reports of alleged violations and to conduct on-site investigations on its own or upon request before issuing a confidential report with recommendations to the Parties concerned.

The Commission would be composed of four Commissioners from states of recognized impartiality who are nominated by the Contadora Group and approved by the Parties (apparently by unanimous vote). Overseeing the daily operations of the Commission would be a Latin American Executive Secretary nominated by the Contadora Group and approved by the Parties by consensus. Aiding the Commission would be an International Inspectorate provided from the States of the Commission, and a group of consultants representing each Central American state. The Commission would be installed upon signature.

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A dispute regarding the application of the act would first be referred to the Ministers of Affairs of the Central American states for a decision by unanimity. If that fails, it would be referred to the Contadora Group, which would use its Good Offices (i.e., mediation) in an attempt to resolve it. If the dispute persists, the Contadora Group would then suggest another peaceful means to resolve the dispute in line with the provisions of the charters of the Organization of American States and the United Nations.

The September 1985 draft responded to concerns about weak verification mechanisms by giving the Commission authority to conduct on-site investigations on its own initiative. However, the procedure for resolving disputes remains closer to the September 1984, draft than to the October 1984 counterproposal, which would have given more power in the resolution of disputes to the Central American foreign ministers. Under the latter formula, the first attempt to resolve a dispute would be by a consensus of the Central American foreign ministers (rather than unanimity), and any appeal of their recommendations would go to a joint group of the Central American and Contadora Group foreign ministers.

Nicaragua had objected to this latter formula, claiming that the other Central American countries could not be considered impartial judges. Despite the change, Nicaragua still has objections to the manner in which the verification commission on security matters, as well as the bodies which would monitor compliance with social, economic and political commitments, would function. However, Nicaragua has not publicly detailed its objections.

There has been no information concerning the positions of the States involved in the Contadora process on the verification procedures that are being secretly discussed. Whether the proposals meet previous U.S. objections is also unclear.

Democracy and national reconciliation

The September 1985 document and the previous treaty drafts speak only in general about the need for national reconciliation and the establishment of democratic institutions. They leave to the initiative of each country the means and timing of achieving these goals. How these goals would be implemented will likely be subject to differing interpretations, not only because the provisions are vague, but because the goals represent an uneasy compromise between Central American states that wanted more specific political commitments and those who wanted none. The draft treaty does establish a special commission on political and refugee affairs to monitor compliance with commitments. However, this commission could only make recommendations. for fulfilling commitments, it would have no means of enforcing compliance.

All the Central American countries apparently accept the political provisions. Nicaragua, although it states that it accepts the political goals and recommendations, apparently has some objections to the procedures of the monitoring body.

To date, the United States has not publicly commented on these political provisions, although the United States would like to see negotiations between the Nicaraguan government and its armed and unarmed opposition well underway before a Contadora treaty is signed, and favors the Nicaraguan Catholic Church as a media-

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tor. According to some sources, the Contadora countries would be willing to mediate or encourage negotiations in Nicaragua, but only between the Sandinista government and its unarmed, or "civic" opposition.

The Contadora Group and Contadora Support Group countries will probably present a proposal for new measures concerning national reconciliation shortly, as a result of the signing of the Caraballeda document.

III. Role for Congress and current options

Past congressional support for Contadora

During 1983, many Members voiced support for the developing Contadora process. Such broad and bipartisan support, however, seemed to accommodate markedly different views on what U.S. interests in Central America were and on how the still nebulous Contadora Initiative could advance those interests. Some saw the Contadora Initiative as an alternative to what they viewed as a military-oriented Administration policy; a promising means to promote peace and democracy in Central America; and a way to avoid an undesirable unilateral U.S. military action there. Others believed that support for the initiative had to be supplemented with strong U.S. military and other actions designed to help quell the leftist insurgency in El Salvador and pressure the Sandinistas to liberalize Nicaraguan politics and reduce ties with Cuba and the U.S.S.R.

Congress voted in the December 1983 Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 84 (P.L. 98–215) to require the President to support Contadora efforts. In 1984, Congress issued another call for U.S. support of the initiative when the House (by a vote of 416–0 on May 1) and the Senate (by a voice vote on June 29) approved H. Con. Res. 261. The resolution stated that the Congress strongly supported the Contadora principles and objectives, and believed that the United States should support efforts to translate the agreed principles into practice.

Although the Administration continued to affirm support of the initiative, many Members came to see Administration policy as undermining the Contadora process. In particular, the increasing U.S. military presence in Honduras and U.S. support for the anti-Sandinista guerrillas were seen as inconsistent with support for the Contadora search for regional peace. As a result, in October 1984, Congress mandated in P.L. 98–473 (the continuing resolution for FY 85 appropriations) that Administration decisionmakers take into account the effect of U.S. policy on the Contadora Initiative. Specifically, P.L. 98–473 required that any Administration request to resume funding to the anti-Sandinista guerrillas must show how such aid would further the goals of U.S. policy for Central America, including the achievement of peace and security in Central America through a comprehensive, verifiable, and enforceable agreement based upon the Contadora Document of Objectives. In July 1985, Congress again reaffirmed its support of Contadora in the Foreign Aid Authorization Act of FY 85 (S. 960) and authorized $2 million to support the implementation of a Contadora treaty. At the same time, Congress urged the President to resume bilateral

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talks with Nicaragua as a means of supporting the Contadora process.

Role for Congress in the Contadora initiative

Although Congress may be requested to approve funds in support of a future Contadora treaty or offer advice and consent to a U.S. commitment to a Contadora treaty or protocol, congressional action over the near term is likely to be limited to holding hearings to consider whether Administration actions reflect Congress' instructions to support the Contadora objectives, and to making statements and adopting resolutions regarding the Contadora process. At present, Members appear to have three general options: (1) making statements, approving resolutions, or otherwise expressing unconditional support for the initiative; (2) approving resolutions or otherwise voicing support for positions that favor the Contadora process but setting firm conditions on U.S. support for any final treaty, or establishing clear reservations about particular treaty provisions; or (3) taking positions or supporting resolutions that would impede or express disapproval of the initiative.

Current options

Support the Contadora initiative and a final treaty without reservation

According to supporters of the Contadora Initiative, the adoption of any Contadora treaty represents the best available means of achieving U.S. political, economic, and security objectives in Central America. From this perspective, an agreement acceptable to U.S. allies in the region should be acceptable to the United States. In their view, the main virtues of such a treaty are the means it would provide to reduce regional conflict while providing multilateral framework to pressure and act against Nicaragua if the Sandinista government should continue to support subversive movements and thus violate the treaty.

Members of Congress favoring this approach tend to see increased U.S. military presence and unilateral U.S. actions in the region, particularly those that appear to be aimed at destabilizing the Nicaraguan government, as having little chance of lasting success but having major potential drawbacks. The drawbacks could include broad international censure; the possibility that Central Americans will weary of the relatively high U.S. military presence; and the temptation to use military force—particularly a direct intervention in Nicaragua.

These supporters of the initiative also tend to believe that democratic solutions to the problems of Central America—particularly the situations in Nicaragua and El Salvador—will come only gradually and will develop best through comprehensive efforts (such as that proposed by the Contadora Initiative) that address the interrelated social, political, and economic problems there. A Contadora settlement is also seen as a means to lessen the level of Central American conflict (to varying degrees in each country depending on the extent to which insurgent groups rely on outside assistance), and to reduce the flow of hundreds of thousands of refugees to other countries in the region and to the United States. With

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drastic reductions in civil conflicts and military tensions, the large amounts of U.S. economic aid to Central America would be better able to improve life there, the argument runs.

To achieve the goals of the initiative, these Members of Congress in favor of the initiative appear inclined to urge the Administration to give strong signs of support for the initiative, to demonstrate flexibility concerning its key provisions, and perhaps to resume separate U.S. talks designed to reassure Nicaragua. These Members also apparently want to link U.S. military and economic aid to El Salvador and Honduras to the Administration's support of the Contadora Initiative. Most of the Members would tend to view U.S. support for anti-Sandinista guerrillas as an obstacle to Contadora negotiations and would prefer to terminate such aid; in their view, the aid would not only pose an impediment to getting the Nicaraguans to sign a Contadora treaty, but would probably torpedo subsequent negotiations to set limits on Central American military forces. In particular, according to their view, if the Sandinistas perceive that they would face a continued threat from the contras even if a Contadora treaty were signed, they would probably avoid setting low limits on their arsenals, military installations, and troop strength. Of course, some Members who strongly support the Contadora Initiative may judge that aid to the contras could provide a useful, if temporary source of pressure on the Sandinistas to begin negotiations; these same Members would also be likely to urge requiring the Administration to cease support for the contras' military activities if Nicaragua signed a regional peace treaty under Contadora.

Support the Contadora initiative with conditions

1. Support the Reagan administration position

Many Members of Congress, with the Reagan Administration, support the Contadora process in principle, but they require a treaty meet certain U.S. conditions. In particular, the Reagan Administration and some Members argue that the Contadora treaty must allow the United States to continue its normal military relations and operations in the region, and must contain verification provisions strong enough to deter cheating by Nicaragua. These Members believe it is necessary to maintain a strong U.S. military presence to ensure the United States' continued capacity to act in the area and as a sign of U.S. determination to act, if necessary.

To achieve their goals, these Members would be inclined to urge the Administration to support the Contadora Initiative, but with clear limits. They would be less inclined than the previous group to push for a resumption of U.S. talks with Nicaragua or to link U.S. aid to El Salvador and Honduras to the Administration's support of the Contadora process. Some of this group would support renewed U.S. funding for the anti-Sandinista guerrillas, as a way to pressure the Sandinistas to meet U.S. conditions on a Contadora treaty. Others presumably would judge that support inconsistent with U.S. support for the Contadora process.

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2. Reserve judgment on the administration position

Some Members may generally support the Reagan Administration's position but wish to reserve final judgment until negotiations have progressed further to see whether the Administration's insistence on maintaining a military presence in Central America and strong verification contribute to or detract from achieving a regional peace settlement under the Contadora Initiative. Thus, some think continued strong U.S. presence in the region, while desirable, is not strictly necessary to U.S. security; they might be willing to drop demands for a continued U.S. military presence, if the demands appeared to become an impediment to the conclusion of an otherwise acceptable treaty. Similarly, if most Central American countries resisted the verification provisions desired by the United States, these Members might wish to reexamine the need for such provisions in the interest of reaching a broadly acceptable agreement.

Because these Members are ambivalent about the Reagan Administration position, they are likely to support calls for resumed U.S. talks with Nicaragua, and for Administration flexibility in negotiations, but unlikely to link U.S. support to El Salvador and Honduras with U.S. support for the Contadora Initiative. They are likely to differ among themselves over a renewal of U.S. aid to the anti-Sandinista guerrillas.

3. Reexamine political commitments

In addition, there are Members who are concerned that the draft treaties' political provisions, which largely leave steps towards democratization to the discretion of each country, would not foster compromise between governments and their armed opponents, particularly in El Salvador and Nicaragua, and thus would bring only temporary peace. These Members may wish to withhold final support for Contadora until these provisions were revised and held greater promise for a meaningful political reconciliation, or until the governments of these countries gave concrete signs or made binding commitments to other organizations that they would put the provisions into effect, or were engaged in or had concluded negotiations with their opponents. (Provisions of the Foreign Aid Authorization Act for FY86 on Nicaragua and the Contadora process call for the United States to promote a church-mediated dialogue between the Nicaraguan government and all elements of the opposition in order to achieve national reconciliation, as called for by the Contadora Document of Objectives.)

Oppose the Contadora initiative and any form of support for a treaty

Members who oppose the Contadora Initiative say that it fails to provide a longterm solution to problems in the area because it does not reduce what they view as the danger to the rest of Central America posed by the Soviet-backed Sandinista government. In their view, Contadora treaty also would legitimize the Sandinistas and the leftist Salvadoran guerrillas. Opponents perceive a treaty as shoring up these groups, just as the trends in the area are

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moving against them. To them, the initiative is also seen as unacceptably restraining U.S. ability to act in its historical sphere of influence.

To achieve their objectives, these Members would encourage the Administration to avoid further endorsement of the Contadora process, encourage the United States to highlight the perceived shortcomings of that process, and continue a strong U.S. military-backed posture in support of U.S. friends in the region. These Members would favor resuming U.S. funding to anti-Sandinista guerrillas.

LEGISLATION

P.L. 99-83, S. 960

Foreign Aid Authorization Act for FY86. Conference report approved by Senate July 30, 1985, and by House July 31. Signed into law Aug. 8, 1985. Section 722 on Nicaragua recommends certain policy measures aimed at securing peace in Central America.

It states the Congress "supports efforts by the Contadora nations, the Organizations of American States, and other appropriate regional organizations to maintain nultilateral pressure on Nicaragua to fulfill its commitments" made to the Organization of American States by the Sandinista provisional junta in June 1979. Urges and requests the U.S. President to "pursue vigorously the use of diplomatic and economic measures to resolve the conflict in Nicaragua," including negotiations to implement the Contadora September 1983 Document of Objectives.

That section also authorizes $2 million for payment by the Secretary of State for expenses arising from implementation by the Contadora nations of an agreement among the countries of Central America based on the Document of Objectives, including peacekeeping, verification, and monitoring systems, to remain available until expended. Provides that the President may submit to Congress a request for budget and other authority to provide additional assistance to further the Central America peace process. The President may do so if, among other things, he determines that negotiations based on the Contadora Document of Objectives have produced an agreement or show promise of producing an agreement. (These funds are appropriated in P.L. 99-88, the Supplemental Appropriations Act for FY85.)

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

01/14/86.—The Foreign Ministers of the five Central American countries endorsed the Jan. 12, 1986, "Caraballeda" declaration of the foreign ministers of the four Contadora Group countries and the four Contadora Support Group countries. The declaration proposed a new approach designed to break the perceived stalemate on Contadora negotiations.

12/08/85.—Contadora negotiations are suspended for five months.

09/13/85.—The Contadora countries and the five Central American countries ended a 2-day meeting called to discuss a new draft treaty drawn by the Contadora countries.

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07/26/85.—During a visit to Mexico, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz stated that the Nicaraguan government must seek to achieve "internal reconciliation" before the United States would resume bilateral talks with Nicaragua, reported the Washington Post.

07/22/85.—The Foreign Ministers of the Contadora Group countries formally called for the United States and Nicaragua to resume bilateral talks.

11/17/84.—The General Assembly of the Organization of American States adopted Resolution 702 urging the Central American States to end the Contadora negotiating process "with the prompt signature" of the draft treaty proposed on Sept. 7, 1984, by the Contadora Group countries.

10/26/84.—The United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 39/4 urging each of the Central American governments to "speed up its consultations with the Contadora Group with the aim of bringing to a conclusion the negotiating process with the early signing of the Contadora Act on Peace and Co-operation in Central American . . ."

10/20/84.—El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica proposed a draft treaty—the Act of Tegucigalpa—which corrected what they perceived to be the deficiencies of the Sept. 7 draft issued by the four Contadora Group countries

09/21/84.—Nicaragua announced that it would sign the draft treaty proposed by the four Contadora Group countries if the United States would sign an appended protocol.

09/07/84.—The four Contadora Group countries issued a draft treaty—the Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America—for the consideration of the five Central American countries.

01/08/84.—The foreign ministers of the four Contadora Group countries and of the five Central American countries issued the "Panama Resolution" of the Contadora Initiative which established working groups from each Central American country to make recommendations on how to achieve the Initiative's goals.

11/21/83.—The United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 38/10 "expressing its firmest support" for the Contadora Group.

09/09/83.—The foreign ministers of the four Contadora Group countries issued the "Document of Objectives" of the Contadora Initiative, which set forth 21 objectives and goals on security, political, and socio-economic issues.

07/27/83.—The Washington Post published the text of a letter sent by President Reagan to the Contadora Group presidents, stating that his government had "consistently expressed strong support for the Contadora process" that must be oriented towards four principles: democracy, non-intervention, cooperation for economic growth, and the withdrawal of all foreign military and security advisers and a freeze on the acquisition of all offensive weapons.

07/18/83.—The presidents of the four Contadora Group countries wrote a letter to President Reagan, expressing concern with the "apparent deterioration" of the Central American situation, and invited President Reagan "to make common cause" with their objectives.

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05/19/83.—The U.N. Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 530 (1983) commending the efforts of the Contadora Group and urging interested States to co-operate fully with it.

04/21/83.—The foreign ministers of the five Central American countries met with the foreign ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela in the first meeting of the so-called "Contadora Initiative."

01/09/83.—Concluding a two-day meeting on Contadora Island, Panama, the foreign ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela, (later known as the "Contadora Group" countries), issued a communique calling for the establishment of a climate of peace through dialogue and negotiations.

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II. CONTADORA DOCUMENTS

CONTADORA 21 POINTS

Document of objectives

Considering:

The situation prevailing in Central America, which is characterized by an atmosphere of tension that threatens security and peaceful coexistence in the region, and which requires, for its solution, observance of the principles of international law governing the actions of States, especially:

The self-determination of peoples;
Non-intervention;
The sovereign equality of States;
The peaceful settlement of disputes;
Refraining from the threat of use of force;
Respect for the territorial integrity of States;
Pluralism in its various manifestations;
Full support for democratic institutions;
The promotion of social justice;

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International co-operation for development;

Respect for and promotion of human rights;

The prohibition of terrorism and subversion;

The desire to reconstruct the Central American homeland through progressive integration of its economic, legal and social institutions;

The need for economic co-operation among the States of Central America so as to make a fundamental contribution to the development of their peoples and the strengthening of their independence;

The undertaking to establish, promote or revitalize representative, democratic systems in all the countries of the region;

The unjust economic, social and political structures which exacerbate the conflicts in Central America;

The urgent need to put an end to the tensions and lay the foundations for understanding and solidarity among the countries of the area;

The arms race and the growing arms traffic in Central America, which aggravate political relations in the region and divert economic resources that could be used for development;

The presence of foreign advisers and other forms of foreign military interference in the zone;

The risks that the territory of Central American States may be used for the purpose of conducting military operations and pursuing policies of destabilization against others;

The need for concerted political efforts in order to encourage dialogue and understanding in Central America, avert the danger of a general spreading of the conflicts, and set in motion the machinery needed to ensure the peaceful coexistence and security of their peoples.

Declare their intention of achieving the following objectives:

To promote détente and put an end to situations of conflict in the area, refraining from taking any action that might jeopardize political confidence or prevent the achievement of peace, security and stability in the region;

To ensure strict compliance with the aforementioned principles of international law, whose violators will be held accountable;

To respect and ensure the exercise of human, political, civil, economic, social, religious and cultural rights;

To adopt measures conducive to the establishment and, where appropriate, improvement of democratic, representative and pluralistic systems that will guarantee effective popular participation in the decision-making process and ensure that the various currents of opinion have free access to fair and regular elections based on the full observance of citizens' rights;

To promote national reconciliation efforts wherever deep divisions have taken place within society, with a view to fostering participation in democratic political processes in accordance with the law;

To create political conditions intended to ensure the international security, integrity and sovereignty of the States of the region;

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To stop the arms race in all its forms and begin negotiations for the control and reduction of current stocks of weapons and on the number of armed troops;

To prevent the installation on their territory of foreign military bases or any other type of foreign military interference;

To conclude agreements to reduce the presence of foreign military advisers and other foreign elements involved in miliary and security activities, with a view to their elimination;

To establish internal control machinery to prevent the traffic in arms from the territory of any country in the region to the territory of another;

To eliminate the traffic in arms, whether within the region or from outside it, intended for persons, organizations or groups seeking to destabilize the Governments of Central American countries;

To prevent the use of their own territory by persons, organizations or groups seeking to destabilize the Governments of Central American countries and to refuse to provide them with or permit them to receive military or logistical support;

To refrain from inciting or supporting acts of terrorism, subversion or sabotage in the countries in the area;

To establish and co-ordinate direct communication systems with a view to preventing or, where appropriate, settling incidents between States of the region;

To continue humanitarian aid aimed at helping Central American refugees who have been displaced from their countries of origin, and to create suitable conditions for the voluntary repatriation of such refugees, in consultation with or with the co-operation of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international agencies deemed appropriate;

To undertake economic and social development programmes with the aim of promoting well being and an equitable distribution of wealth;

To revitalize and restore economic integration machinery in order to attain sustained development on the basis of solidarity and mutual advantage;

To negotiate the provision of external monetary resources which will provide additional means of financing the resumption of intra-regional trade, meet the serious balance-of-payments problems, attract funds for working capital, support programmes to extend and restructure production systems and promote medium- and long-term investment projects;

To negotiate better and broader access to international markets in order to increase the volume of trade between the countries of Central America and the rest of the world, particularly the industrialized countries; by means of a revision of trade practices, the elimination of tariff and other barriers, and the achievement of price stability at a profitable and fair level for the products exported by the countries of the region;

To establish technical co-operation machinery for the planning, programming and implementation of multi-sectoral investment and trade promotion projects.

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The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Central American countries, with the participation of the countries in the Contadora Group, have begun negotiations with the aim of preparing for the conclusion of the agreements and the establishment of the machinery necessary to formalize and develop the objectives contained in this document, and to bring about the establishment of appropriate verification and monitoring systems. To that end, account will be taken of the initiatives put forward at the meetings convened by the Contadora Group.

PANAMA RESOLUTION

Bulletin issued on January 8, 1984, in the city of Panama, at the closing of the meeting held by the ministers of foreign relations of the Contadora Group and of the Central American Countries

In Panama City, Republic of Panama, on January 7th and 8th, 1984, the Ministers of Foreign Relations of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela, members of the Contadora Group, met with their counterparts from Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.

The meeting, which was the 12th conference of the Contadora Group and the 5th with the Central American ministers, was held on the first anniversary of the start of the process of bringing peace to the region initiated with the declaration of Contadora. Hence, the essential significance that the Contadora process has had to consolidate dialogue among all Central American states was underlined, as well as the search for a political understanding that may lead to peaceful and negotiated solutions to the conflicts, and to reestablish harmony and stability in the area.

During this joint meeting of ministers and within the framework of the Cancun statement on Central American peace, specific courses of action for the implementation of the document of objectives which was adopted by the Central American governments on September 1983, were defined. To this end, the enclosed document entitled "Norms for the Implementation of the Commitments of the Document of Objectives", related to regional security issues, political matters and economic and social cooperation, was adopted.

Panama, January 8, 1984.

Norms for the implementation of the commitments of the document of objectives

The governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua

Considering:

(1) That on September 1983 the document of objectives was approved by the five governments as a framework for the peace on the region.

(2) That it is necessary to implement the measures contained in said document.

Resolve:

I. To adopt the following norms for their immediate fulfillment:

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1. Security issues

(A) To compile a record or detailed inventory of military facilities, armament and forces of each Central American state, with the aim of setting the criteria for the introduction of a policy of control and reduction of the same, and which foresees maximum limits and a reasonable balance of the forces in the region.

(B) To carry out a census and establish a schedule in each country for the reduction—in order to end their presence—of all foreign military advisers and other foreign elements which participate in military or security activities.

(C) To identify and to eradicate all forms of support, promotion or financing to groups or irregular forces which aim to destabilize the Central American governments.

(D) To identify and eradicate groups or irregular forces which form, or through, the territory of any Central American state, participate in destabilizing actions against another state of the region.

(E) To identify areas, routes and means used for the intra and extra regional illegal arms traffic, in order to eliminate such exchanges.

(F) To establish systems of direct communication in order to prevent or to resolve incidents among the states.

2. Political issues

(A) To promote national reconciliation on the basis of justice, freedom and democracy, and with these purposes to establish the necessary mechanisms that would facilitate the dialogue among the countries of the region.

(B) To guarantee a total respect of human rights, and to that end effectively observe the precepts established by international legal instruments and constitutional legislations on the subject.

(C) To promulgate, or to review electoral legislation, for the holding of elections which guarantee an effective popular participation.

(D) To establish independent electoral bodies for the creation of trustworthy and reliable electoral systems, which ensure the impartiality and democratic character of the electoral process.

(E) To establish or, where necessary, to update regulations which guarantee the existence and participation of political parties representative of the various opinion trends.

(F) To determine an electoral calendar and to adopt measures which guarantee the participation of political parties in conditions of equality.

(G) To endeavor actions tending to create a climate of political trust among the governments of the region in order to contribute to the removal of tension from the area.

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3. Social and economic issues

(A) To increase assistance programs to Central American refugees and to facilitate voluntary repatriations through cooperation with the Governments involved, through communications and/or coordination with national humanitarian institutions and competent international organizations.

(B) To cooperate fully with the Central American Integration Bank, the Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL), the Active Committee for the Support of Economic and Social Development in Central America and with the Permanent Secretariat of the General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration (SIECA).

(C) To jointly negotiate the acquisition of foreign resources that will allow the revitalization of the Central American systems of integration.

(D) To promote intraregional trade and a greater and better access of Cental American products to international markets.

(E) To further programs of joint venture.

(F) To establish fair economic and social structures, which consolidate an authentic democratic system or to ensure the rights of the people to employment, education, health care and cultural opportunities.

II. To empower the technical group-advisory group to the joint meetings of the Central American foreign ministers and of the Contadora group—with the necessary means to follow up the activities set forth by this document on security, political, social and economic issues. The technical group will report to the ministerial meeting on the progress made in the implementation of these measures.

III. To create, within the Contadora group framework, three working commissions in charge of the preparation of studies, legal projects and recommendations about topics related to security, political, economic and social issues. These commissions will also prepare proposals for the verification and control of the observance of the measures adopted. These working commissions will be guided by the following norms:

(A) They will be formed by representatives of the Central American governments. Each country will be able to appoint up to two advisers per commission.

(B) The Contadora group will convene then and will participate in the working sessions of the commissions in order to continue providing its active cooperation in the analysis of the subjects to be studied and in the formulation of agreements.

(C) Foreign advice, whether from private individuals or from representaitves of international organizations, must be previously accepted by consensus.

(D) The working commissions will be set up at the latest by January 31, 1984; the participating governments will appoint their representatives and advisers and will notify the ministry of foreign affairs of the Republic of Panama.

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(E) Each commission will prepare and submit their corresponding calendars and working schedules before February 29, 1984.

(F) The working commissions will carry out their functions within the guidelines of the "Document of Objectives" and their tasks will be coordinated by the technical group; they will submit their studies, legal projects and recommendations to the joint meeting of ministers for foreign affairs no later than April 30, 1984.

Panama, January 8, 1984.

CONTADORA ACT FOR PEACE AND COOPERATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Preamble

The Governments of the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua:

1. Aware of the urgent need to strengthen peace, cooperation, trust, democracy, and economic and social development among the peoples of the region through the observane of principles and measures that will permit greater understanding between the Central American governments;

2. Concerned by the situation in Central America which is characterized by a serious erosion of political trust, the profound economic and social crisis, the grave situation of refugees and displaced persons, border incidents, the arms race, arms trafficking, the presence of foreign military advisers, the conduct of international military maneuvers in the territory of the States of the region, and the existence of military bases, schools, and installations, and other forms of foreign military presence, as well as the use by irregular forces of the territory of certain States for activities aimed at destabilizing other States of the region;

Convinced:

3. That tensions and present conflicts could worsen and lead to a generalized large-scale war;

4. That the goal of restoring peace and confidence in the area can be achieved only through unconditional respect for the principles of international law, especially with regard to the right of peoples to choose, freely and without outside interference, the model of political, economic, and social organization best suited to their interests, through institutions that represent the freely expressed will of the people;

5. That it is important to create, develop, and strengthen representative participatory and pluralistic democratic systems in all countries of the region;

6. That there is a need to create political conditions aimed at guaranteeing the security, integrity, and sovereignty of the States of the region;

7. That genuine regional security can be achieved through the adoption of agreements on security and disarmament;

8. That the national security interests of the States in the region must be taken into account in the adoption of measures for halting the arms race with a view to establishing a reasonable balance of forces;

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9. That it is highly advisable for the establishment of a reasonable balance of forces, that maximum limits on military development be determined and that there be a consequent reduction in and control of the numbers of weapons, men under arms, and military installations in accordance with the need for stability and security in the area;

10. That military superiority as an objective of the States of the region, the presence of foreign military advisers, the conduct of international military maneuvers in the territory of the States of the region, and the existence of military bases, schools, installations, and other forms of foreign military presence, the presence of irregular forces, and the trafficking of arms endanger regional security and constitute factors of destabilization in the area;

11. That agreements on regional security must be subject to an effective system of verification and control;

12. That destabilization of the governments in the area—as expressed by the encouragement or support of activities of irregular groups or forces, acts of terrorism, subversion, or sabotage, or the use of the territory of one State for activities that affect the security of another State—violates the basic rules of international law and of peaceful coexistence between States;

13. That the creation of instruments that permit implementation of a policy of detente must be based on the existence of trust between States that will effectively reduce political and military tensions between them;

14. Recalling the provisions of the United Nations on the definition of aggression and other acts prohibited by international law, particularly in United Nations General Assembly Resolutions Nos. 3314 (XXIX), 2625 (XXV), and 2131 (XX), and as contained in the pertinent resolutions of the Organization of American States;

15. Taking into account the declaration on strengthening international security, adopted as Resolution No. 2734 (XXV) by the United Nations General Assembly, as well as the corresponding legal instruments of the Inter-American system;

16. Reaffirming the need to promote, in those cases where the society has been deeply divided, actions leading to national reconciliation that will allow the people to participate, under the law, in authentic democratic political processes;

Whereas:

17. Beginning with the United Nations Charter of 1945 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, various international organizations and conferences have drafted and adopted declarations, pacts, protocols, conventions, and rules to effectively protect human rights in general and certain of those rights specifically;

18. Not all the Central American countries have accepted all the existing human rights instruments, and it would be desirable for them to do so in order to have a comprehensive regime that would permit respect for and the guarantee of human, political, civil, economic, social, religious, and cultural rights;

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19. In many cases, inadequate domestic laws may impair the effective observance of human rights as defined in declarations and other international instruments;

20. Each State must concern itself with modernizing its laws so that they will be capable of guaranteeing the effective enjoyment of human rights;

21. One of the most effective means of establishing the observance of the human rights enshrined in international instruments and in the constitutions and laws of individual States is for the judicial power to have the authority and the autonomy it needs to put an end to violations of those rights;

22. To that end, the absolute independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed;

23. Such guarantee will be obtained only if the judiciary enjoys stability with respect to its responsibilities and autonomy with respect to its budget so that its independence from other branches of government is absolute and undisputed;

Convinced, furthermore:

24. Of the need to perfect just economic and social structures that will consolidate a genuine democratic system and allow their peoples full access to the right to work, education, health, and culture;

25. Of the high degree of interdependence among the countries of Central America and of the potential offered by the process of economic integration;

26. That the magnitude of the economic and social crisis affecting the region has demonstrated the need for changes in the economic and social structures that will reduce the dependency and foster the self-sufficiency of the Central American countries, enabling them to reaffirm their own identity;

27. Of the necessity of cooperating in the efforts each country is making to hasten its economic and social development by lending active assistance that is compatible with the needs and objectives of development in each country;

28. That the process of economic integration in Central America must constitute an effective instrument of economic and social development based on the principles of justice, solidarity, and mutual advantage;

29. That there is a need to reactivate, improve, and restructure the process of economic integration in Central America with the active and institutional participation of all the States of the region;

30. That Central American institutions and authorities are called upon to assume primary responsibility in modifying current economic and social structures and strengthening the process of regional integration;

31. Of the need and the advisability of engaging in joint economic and social development programs that will contribute to the process of economic integration in Central America as part of the development plans and priorities adopted independently by those countries;

32. That the vital needs for investment for the development and economic recovery of the Central American countries, and their joint efforts to obtain financing for specific, priority

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projects, make it essential to expand and strengthen the Central American programs of international regional and subregional financial institutions;

33. That the regional crisis has resulted in massive flows of refugees and displaced persons, a situation that merits urgent consideration;

34. Concerned by the constant deterioration of social conditions and of the situation with respect to employment, education, health, and housing in the countries of Central America;

35. Reaffirming their desire to resolve their conflicts within the framework of this Act, without prejudice to the right to appeal to other competent international forums;

36. Recalling the support granted to the Contadora Group through Resolutions 530 and 562 of the United Nations Security Council, Resolutions 38/10 and 39/4 of the United Nations General Assembly, and Resolutions AG/RES 675 (XIII-0/83) and AG/RES (XIV-84) of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States;

37. Prepared to implement fully the Document of Objectives and the Rules for the Execution of the Commitments assumed in that document, adopted by their Ministers of Foreign Affairs at Panama City of September 9, 1983, and January 8, 1984, respectively, under the auspices of the Governments of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela, which comprise the Contadora Group;

Have agreed as follows:

The Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America

Part I—Commitments

CHAPTER I—GENERAL AND COMMITMENTS

Sole Section. Principles

The Parties undertake, in accordance with the obligations they have assumed under international law, to:

1. Respect the following principles:

(a) Renunciation of the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of States;

(b) Peaceful settlement of disputes;

(c) Non-interference in the internal affairs of other States;

(d) Cooperation of States in resolving international problems;

(e) The legal equality of States, respect for sovereignty, self-determination of peoples, and the fostering of respect for human rights;

(f) The right to engage freely in international trade;

(g) Abstention from discriminatory practices in economic relations between the States, respecting their systems of political, economic, and social organization.

(h) Fulfillment in good faith of the obligation assumed in accordance with international law;

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2. In application of these principles they will:

(a) Abstain from any action that is incompatible with the objectives and principles of the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American States and is taken against the territorial integrity, political independence or unity of any of the States, and particularly any such action that constitutes a threat or use of force.

(b) Solve their disputes by peaceful means, by observing the basic principles of international law contained in the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American States.

(c) Respect the rules enshrined in treaties and other international accords as regards diplomatic and territorial asylum.

(d) Respect the existing international boundaries between States.

(e) Abstain from military occupation of the territory of any of the other States in the region.

(f) Abstain from any type of military, political, economic, or other coercion intended to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by other States of the rights inherent in their sovereignty.

(g) Take the steps necessary to guarantee the inviolability of their borders against irregular groups or forces seeking to destabilize the governments of other States from within their own territories.

(h) Refuse to permit their territories to be used for acts contrary to the sovereign rights of other States, and ensure that the prevailing conditions in their territories do not threaten international peace and security.

(i) Respect the principle that no State or group of States has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, through arms or any other form of interference, in the internal or external affairs of another State.

(j) Respect the peoples' right to self-determination without foreign intervention or coercion, avoiding the threat of force or the direct or covert use of force to weaken the national unity and territorial integrity of any other State.

CHAPTER II—COMMITMENTS RELATING TO POLITICAL MATTERS

Section 1. Commitments relating to a reduction of regional tension and the encouragement of trust

The Parties undertake to:

3. Encourage mutual trust by all means at their disposal and avoid any action likely to threaten peace and security in the Central American area.

4. Abstain from issuing or fostering propaganda in favor of violence or war as well as hostile propaganda against any Central American government, and comply with and disseminate the principles of peaceful coexistence and friendly cooperation.

5. To this end, their respective governmental authorities shall:

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(a) Avoid any spoken or written declaration that may aggravate the existing situation of conflict in the area.

(b) Urge the mass media to contribute to understanding and cooperation between the peoples of the region.

(c) Encourage more contact and understanding between their peoples through cooperation in all areas related to education, science, technology, and culture.

(d) Jointly consider future actions and mechanisms that will contribute to the attainment and improvement of a climate of stable and lasting peace.

6. Jointly seek a regional solution that will eliminate the causes of tension in Central America and ensure the inalienable rights of the people in the face of foreign pressures and interests.

Section 2. Commitments relating to National Reconciliation

Each of the parties will reiterate to the other Central American States the commitment it has made to its own people to guarantee the preservation of domestic peace as a contribution to the peace of the region, and to that end resolves to:

7. Take measures to establish and, if appropriate, improve representative pluralistic democratic systems that ensure effective participation by the people, politically organized, in the decision-making process, and ensure that various opinion groups have free access to honest and periodic electoral processes based upon full observance of the rights of citizens.

8. In those cases where deep divisions have occurred within the society, strongly encourage national reconciliation activities that allow fully guaranteed participation by the people in authentic democratic political processes on the basis of justice, freedom, and democracy, and, to this end, create mechanisms that will permit a dialogue with opposition groups, according to the law.

9. Issue and, if appropriate, ratify, expand, and improve laws and regulations offering true amnesty that allows their citizen to become fully reincorporated in political, economic, and social life. In like manner, guarantee the inviolability of life, liberty, and personal security for those granted amnesty.

Section 3. Commitments relating to human rights

The Parties undertake, in accordance with their respective domestic laws and with the obligations they have assumed under international law, to:

10. Guarantee full respect for human rights and, to this end, comply with the obligations contained in the international legal instruments and constitutional provisions on the subject.

11. Initiate their respective constitutional procedures so that they may become parties to the following international instruments:

(a) International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 1966.

(b) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.

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(c) Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.

(d) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965.

(e) Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951.

(f) Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967.

(g) Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 1952. [1953]

(h) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979.

(i) 1953 Protocol Amending the Conventon on Slavery of 1926, 1953.

(j) Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 1956.

(k) International Covenant on the Civil and Political Rights of Women, 1953.

(l) American Convention on Human Rights, 1969.

(m) International Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1985.

12. Draft and submit the necessary legislation to their competent domestic bodies in order to accelerate the process of modernizing and updating their legislation so that it may more effectively promote and ensure due respect for human rights.

13. Draft and submit to their competent domestic bodies the legislation necessary to:

(a) Guarantee independence and stability for those vested with the judicial power so that they may act without political pressures and themselves guarantee stability for other members of the judiciary.

(b) Guarantee the autonomy and budgetary stability of the judiciary so that its independence from the other branches is absolute and unquestionable.

Section 4. Commitments relating to electoral processes and parliamentary cooperation

Each of the Parties will reiterate to the other Central American States the commitment it has made to its own people to guarantee the preservation of domestic peace as a contribution to the peace of the region, and to that end resolves to:

14. Adopt measures to guarantee, under equal conditions, the participation of the political parties in the electoral processes, ensuring their access to the mass media and their freedom of assembly and speech.

15. They also undertake to:

[(a)] Implement the following measures:

(1) Promulgate or amend electoral laws so that elections may be held that guarantee effective participation by the people.

(2) Establish independent electoral bodies that will prepare a reliable voting list and ensure that the process is impartial and democratic.

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(3) Establish or, if appropriate, update rules that guarantee the existence and participation of political parties which are representative of the various opinion groups.

(4) Establish a schedule of elections and take steps to ensure participation by political parties under equal conditions.

[(b)] Propose to their respective legislative bodies that they:

(1) Hold regular meetings in alternating venues in order to exchange experiences, contribute to the reduction of tensions, and encourage greater communication, thus fostering rapprochement among the countries in the area.

(2) Take measures to maintain relations with the Latin American Parliament and its working groups.

(3) Exchange information and experiences in their field, and compile, for purposes of comparative study, the election laws and related provisions in force in each country.

(4) Be present, as observers, at the various stages of the elections held in the region. For this purpose, an express invitation from the State holding the election shall be required.

(5) Hold periodic technical meetings at the location and with the agenda agreed upon by consensus at each preceding meeting.

CHAPTER III—COMMITMENTS RELATING TO SECURITY MATTERS

In accordance with the obligations they have assumed under international law and for purposes of establishing the foundations of an effective and lasting peace, the Parties undertake security commitments regarding the banning of international military maneuvers; the halting of the arms race; the dismantling of bases, schools, and other foreign military installations; the removal of foreign military advisers and other foreign personnel participating in military or security activities; the prohibition of arms trafficking; the elimination of support to irregular forces; the abstention from encouraging or supporting acts of terrorism, subversion, and sabotage; and, finally, the establishment of a regional system of direct communication.

Accordingly, the Parties will take specific actions as follows:

Section 1. Commitments relating to military maneuvers.

16. Comply, when conducting national military maneuvers, with the following provisions, which shall take effect upon signature of this Act:

(a) In the event that national military maneuvers are being conducted in zones less than thirty (30) kilometers from the territory of another State, the required prior notification shall be given to the other States that are Parties and to the Verification and Control Commission that is referred to in Part II of this Act at least thirty (30) days in advance.

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(b) The notification shall contain the following information:

(1) Name
(2) Purpose
(3) Participating personnel, units, and forces
(4) Area where maneuvers are planned
(5) Program and schedule
(6) Equipment and weapons to be used

(c) An invitation shall be extended to observers from adjacent States that are parties.

17. Comply, when conducting international military maneuvers in their respective territories, with the following provisions:

1. Reduce, with a view to eliminating, maneuvers involving the participation of armed forces of other States.

2. The performance of international military maneuvers in the respective territories [of the Parties] shall be subject, from the date of signature of this Act and of the banning of such maneuvers, to the following provisions:

(a) Ensure that in no case they are intended to intimidate a Central American State or any other State.

(b) Give notification of such maneuvers to the Parties and to the Verification and Control Commission referred to in Part II of this Act at least ninety (90) days in advance. The notification shall contain the following information:

(1) Name
(2) Purpose
(3) Participating States
(4) Participating personnel, units, and forces
(5) Area where maneuvers are planned
(6) Program and schedule
(7) Equipment and weapons to be used

(c) They [international military maneuvers] shall not be performed within a zone situated less than 50 kilometers from the territory of a State that is not participating in them unless it [sic] has its express consent.

(d) Maneuvers shall not be held more than once a year and shall not last longer than 15 days.

(e) Limit to 3,000 the total number of military personnel that participate in the maneuvers. In no case shall the number of troops from other States exceed the number of nationals participating in the maneuvers.

(f) Invite observers from the States that are parties.

3. If a State that is a Party deems that some violation of the foregoing provisions has occurred, it may appeal to the Verification and Control Commission.

4. Prohibit international military maneuvers once the maximum limits on weapons and troops agreed upon by the Parties have been reached, as provided for in paragraph No. 19 of this Chapter III.

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Section 2. Commitments relating to arms and military strength

18. Stop the arms race in all its forms and immediately begin negotiations on the control and reduction of the current arms inventory as well as the number of men under arms.

19. On the basis of the foregoing, the Parties agree to the following stages of implementation:

First stage

(a) The Parties will suspend, from the date of signature of the Act, all procurement of war materiel except replacements munitions and spare parts needed to maintain already existing equipment in operation, and will refrain from increasing their military strength while the maximum limits of military development are being established, during the time period stipulated for the second stage;

(b) The Parties will deliver simultaneously to the Verification and Control Commission their respective current inventories of arms, military installations, and a list of men under arms [sic—list of armed units?], within 15 days of the date of signature of this Act.

The inventories shall be prepared in conformity with the basic criteria that appear in the Annex of this Act with the definitions contained therein.

(c) Within sixty (60) days after signature of this Act, the Verification and Control Commission shall conclude the technical studies and shall suggest to the parties, without prejudice to the negotiations they have agreed to begin, the maximum limits of their military development in accordance with the basic criteria established in paragraph No. 22 of this Section, as well as schedules for their reduction or dismantling.

Second stage

Sixty (60) days after the signature of this Act, the Parties will establish, within the next thirty (30) days [sic], the following:

(a) Maximum limits for the types of arms classified in the annex to this Act, and schedules for their reduction.

(b) Maximum limits for military personnel strengths and military installations that each Party may have, and the schedules for their reduction or dismantling.

(c) If during such time period the Parties do not reach an agreement on the aforementioned maximum limits and schedules, those suggested by the Commission in its technical studies shall prevail temporarily. The Verification and Control Commission shall assist the Parties in pursuing the negotiations in order to reach an agreement.

The maximum limits referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) above, as well as the schedules, shall be considered an integral part of this Act and shall have the same legally binding force.

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20. In order to meet the needs of peace, stability, security, and economic and social development of the countries of the region, no State will seek the hegemony of its armed forces over those of the other States considered on an individual basis [meaning?—over any of the other States?]. To that end, the Parties will consider the following basic criteria in order to reach an agreement on the maximum limits of military development for the Central American States:

(1) Evaluation of the internal and external security requirements of the State

(2) Area

(3) Population

(4) Distribution of economic resources, infrastructure, and population within the national territory

(5) Length and features of land and maritime boundaries.

(6) Ratio of military expenditures to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

(7) Ratio of military budget to government expenditures and comparison with other social indicators

(8) Highest level of military technology appropriate for the region

21. Refrain from introducing new weapons systems that may bring about qualitative or quantitative changes in current war materiel inventories.

22. Refrain from introducing, possessing, or utilizing lethal chemical, biological, radiological, and other weapons that may be considered excessively harmful or indiscriminate.

23. Initiate the necessary constitutional procedures to be in a position to sign and ratify or to accede to international treaties and other agreements on disarmament, if they have not already done so.

Section 3. Commitments relating to foreign military bases

24. Eliminate existing foreign military bases, schools, and installations in their territories, as defined in paragraphs No. 11, 12, and 13, of the Annex, within 180 days of the signature of this Act. To that end, the Parties will simultaneously submit to the Verification and Control Commission lists of said foreign military bases, schools, and installations within 15 days of the date of signature of this Act; said lists shall be prepared in accordance with the criteria contained in the numbered paragraphs in the Annex.

25. Refrain from authorizing the establishment of foreign bases, schools, and other installations of a military nature in their territories.

Section 4. Commitments relating to foreign military advisers

26. Within fifteen (15) days after signing this Act, submit to the Verification and Control Commission a list of the foreign military advisers and other foreign personnel participating in military, paramilitary, and security activities in their territories. In preparing this list, the definitions contained in paragraph No. 14 of the Annex shall be taken into account.

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27. Within 180 days after signature of this Act and in accordance with the studies and recommendations of the Verification and Control Commission, withdraw foreign military advisers and other foreign personnel capable of participating in military, paramilitary, and security activities.

28. With respect to advisers performing technical duties relating to the installation and maintenance of military equipment, a control list shall be established in conformity with the terms set forth in their contracts or agreements. On the basis of this control list, the Verification and Control Commission shall propose to the Parties reasonable limits on the number of such advisers within the same time period established in paragraph No. 27, above. The agreed limits shall be an integral part of the Act.

Section 5. Commitments relating to arms traffic

29. Eliminate illegal arms traffic, as defined in paragraph No. 15 of the Annex, to persons, organizations, irregular forces, or armed groups attempting to destabilize the governments of the Parties.

30. To that end, establish control mechanisms at airports, landing fields, ports, terminals, and border crossings points; on land, air, sea, and river routes; and at any other points or areas likely to be used for arms traffic.

31. Report to the Verification and Control Commission presumed or known arms-traffic violations, with sufficient evidence to enable the Commission to conduct the necessary investigations and to present such findings and recommendations as it considers appropriate.

Section 6. Commitments relating to the prohibition of support for irregular forces

32. Refrain from lending any political, military, financial, or other support to individuals, groups, irregular forces, or armed groups advocating the overthrown or destabilization of other governments, and prevent by all means at their disposal the use of their territory for making or organizing attacks, acts of sabotage, kidnappings, or criminal acts in the territory of another State.

33. Maintain strict vigilance along their borders to prevent their territory from being used for any armed action against a neighboring State.

34. Deny the use of and dismantle logistical and operational support installations and facilities in their territories used to launch activities against neighboring governments.

35. Disarm and remove from border zones any group or irregular force identified as being responsible for actions against a neighboring State. Once the irregular forces have been disbanded, proceed, with financial and logistical assistance from the international organizations and governments interested in restoring peace in Central America, to relocate the irregulars or return them to their countries in accordance with the terms established by the interested governments.

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36. Report to the Vertification and Control Commission presumed or known violations, with sufficient evidence to enable the Commission to conduct the necessary investigations and to present such findings and recommendations as it considers appropriate.

Section 7. Commitments relating to terrorism, subversion, or sabotage

37. Refrain from lending political, military, financial, or other support to subersive, terrorist, or sabotage activities attempting to destabilize or overthrown the governments of the region.

38. Refrain from organizing, encouraging, or participating in acts of terrorism, subversion, or sabotage in another State, and from permitting organized activities within their territories for the purpose of committing such criminal acts.

39. Observe the provisions of the following international treaties and agreements.

(a) The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970.

(b) Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, 1971.

(c) Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.

(d) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons. Including Diplomatic Agents, 1973

(e) International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 1979

40. Initiate constitutional procedures so that, if they have not already done so, they will be able to sign and ratify or accede to the international treaties and agreements referred to in the preceding paragraph.

41. Prevent within their respective territories the planning or perpetration of criminal acts against other States or nationals of other States by terrorist groups or organizations. To that end they will strengthen cooperation among agencies responsible for immigration and law enforcement matters as well as among the appropriate civilian authorities.

42. Report to the Verification and Control Commission presumed to known violations, with sufficient evidence to enable the Commission to conduct the necessary investigations and to present such findings and recommendations as it considers appropriate.

Section 8. Commitments relating to direct communication systems

43. With a view to preventing incidents, establish a regional communications system that ensures timely linkage between the appropriate governmental, civilian, and military authorities and the Verification and Control Commission.

44. Establish mixed security commissions in order to prevent incidents and resolve disputes between neighboring States.

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CHAPTER IV—COMMITMENTS ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MATTERS

Section 1. Commitments in the economic and social fields

In order to strengthen the process of Central American economic integration and the institutions comprising and supporting it, the Parties agree to:

45. Reactivate, improve, and restructure the process of Central American economic integration, bringing it into harmony with the various forms of political, economic, and social organization of the countries of the area.

46. Support resolution No. 1/84 of the Thirtieth Meeting of Ministers Responsible for Central American Economic Integration, passed July 27, 1984, and directed towards the institutional reestablishment of the process of Central American integration.

47. Support and encourage the adoption of agreements for strengthening trade within Central America, within the legal framework and in the spirit of integration.

48. Not to adopt or support coercive or discriminatory measures harmful to the economy of any Central American country.

49. Adopt measures for strengthening the financial organizations of the area, incuding the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, supporting its efforts to obtain resources and diversify its operations, and preserving the decision-making power and the interests of all Central American countries.

50. Strengthen the multilateral payment mechanisms within the Central American Common Market Fund, and reactivate those mechanisms that operate through Central American Clearing House. Available international financial assistance may be requested in support of these objectives.

51. Undertake sectoral cooperative projects in the area, such as the electrical energy production and distribution system, the regional food security system, the priority health needs plan for Central America and Panama, and others that would contribute to Central American economic integration.

52. Jointly examine the problem of Central American foreign debt on the basis of an evaluation that takes into account the internal situation to each country, its ability to pay, the critical economic situation in the area, and the flow of additional resources needed to further its economic and social development.

53. Support the process of formulating and subsequently implementing a new Central American tariff and customs regime.

54. Adopt joint measures to protect and promote their exports, integrating the processing, marketing, and transportation of their products insofar as possible.

55. Adopt the necessary measures to accord juridical personality to the Central American Monetary Council.

56. Support efforts of CADESCA, in coordination with subregional bodies, to obtain from the international community the additional financial resources necessary for Central America's economic reactivation.

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57. With the cooperation of the ILO, to apply international labor standards and conform their domestic legislation thereto, particularly in those areas which contribute to the reconstruction of Central American societies and economies. Likewise, with ILO's cooperation, conduct programs for the creation of jobs, training of workers, and use of appropriate technologies designed for better utilization of the labor force and natural resources of each country.

58. Request the Pan American Health Organization and UNICEF, as well as other development agencies and the international financial community, to support the financing of the Priority Health Needs Plan for Central America and Panama approved by the Ministers of Health of the Central American Isthmus, meeting in San Jose on March 16, 1984.

Section 2. Commitments on refugee matters

The Parties agree to take the necessary steps to:

59. If they have not already done so, follow the constitutional procedures for acceding to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees.

60. Adopt the terminology established in the Convention and Protocol referred to in the preceding paragraph in order to differentiate between refugees and other categories of immigrants.

61. Establish the necessary internal mechanisms for implementing the provisions of the Convention and Protocol referred to in paragraph 57, when accession takes place.

62. Establish consultative machinery between Central American countries and representatives of the government offices in charge of the refugee problem in each State.

63. Support the work of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Central America, and establish direct means of coordination in order to facilitate its efforts to carry out its mandate.

64. [Ensure] That any repatriation of refugees be voluntary, based on expressed individual wishes, and undertaken with the cooperation of the UNHCR.

65. [Ensure] That tripartite commissions composed of representatives of the sending State, the receiving State, and the UNHCR be set up in order to facilitate repatriation of refugees.

66. Strengthen programs of assistance and protection for refugees, especially in the fields of health, education, employment, and security.

67. Establish programs and projects with a view to permitting the refugees to achieve self-sufficiency.

68. With the collaboration of the UNHCR or other international agencies, train the officials in each state responsible for providing protection and assistance to refugees.

69. Ask the international community to provide immediate assistance to Central American refugees, both directly, through bilateral or multilateral agreements, and through the UNHCR and other organizations and agencies.

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70. With the assistance of the UNHCR, identify other possible host countries for Central American refugees. In no case shall a refugee be transferred to a third country against his will.

71. [Ensure] That the governments of the area make the necessary efforts to eradicate the causes of the refugee problem.

72. [Ensure] That once the bases for voluntary and individual repatriation have been agreed upon, with full guarantees for the refugees, the receiving countries allow official delegations from the countries of origin, accompanied by representatives of the UNHCR and the receiving country, to visit the refugee camps.

73. [Ensure] That receiving countries, in coordination with the UNHCR, facilitate the procedures for the departure of refugees in cases of voluntary and individual repatriation.

74. Establish control measures in the receiving countries in order to prevent refugees from participating in activities against the country of origin, always with due respect for the human rights of refugees.

75. Consider as displaced persons those who have been forced to abandon their habitual residence, their assets, and their livelihood as a result of the prevailing conflicts, and have moved to another location in their own country in search of personal protection and security and of assistance in meeting their basic needs.

76. At the request of the Party concerned, take coordinated action with the international community in order to obtain the necessary cooperation for the programs for displaced persons that each Central American country develop.

Part II—Commitments Relating to Implementation and Follow-up

1. The Ministers of Foreign Relations of the Central American States shall receive the advice, reports, and recommendations submitted by the mechanisms of implementation provided for in Part II, and shall unanimously adopt the corresponding decisions to ensure complete fulfillment of the commitments contained in the Act. Any disputes shall be dealt with according to the procedures provided for in this Act.

2. The Parties will establish the following mechanisms for the implementation of the commitments contained in this Act:

A. Comité ad hoc para la Evaluación y el Seguimiento de los Compromisos en Materia Política y de Refugiados [Ad Hoc Committee for the Evaluation and Follow-up of Commitments in Political and Refugee Matters];

B. Comisión de Verificación y Control en Materia de Seguridad [Commission for Verification and Control in Security Matters];

C. Comité ad hoc para la Evaluación y el Seguimiento de los Compromisos en Materia Ecconómica y Social [Ad Hoc Committee for the Evaluation and Follow-up of Commitments in Economic and Social Matters].

3. The mechanisms established in the Act shall have the following membership, structure, and functions:

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A. Comité ad hoc para la Evaluación y el Seguimiento de los Compromisos en Materia Política y de Refugiados [Ad Hoc Committee for the Evaluation and Follow-up of Commitments in Political and Refugee Matters].

(a) Membership

The Committee shall be composed of five (5) prominent persons of recognized competence and impartiality nominated by the Contadora Group and approved by mutual agreement of the Parties. The members of the Committee shall be nationals of States other than the Parties.

(b) Duties

The Committee shall evaluate the reports that the Parties undertake to furnish concerning the manner in which they have proceeded to implement their commitments in the area of national reconciliation, human rights, and the electoral and refugee processes.

Moreover, the Committee shall receive the communications on these topics sent to it for information by organizations or individuals who can provide it with data useful on its work.

The Committee shall gather the information it deems relevant; for this purpose the Party referred to in the communication shall permit Committee members to enter its territory and shall grant them the proper facilities.

The Committee shall periodically prepare a report on the implementation of the commitments, which may include conclusions and recommendations.

The Committee shall send its reports to the Parties and to the governments of the Contadora Group.

Upon conclusion of the time period indicated by the regulations for the Committee to receive the observations of the Parties, final reports shall be prepared and made public unless the Committee decides otherwise.

(c) Bylaws

The Committee shall draw up its own bylaws and inform the Parties of them.

B. *Comisión de Verificación y Control en Materia de Seguridad* [Commission for Verification and Control in Security Matters].

(a) Membership

The Commission shall be composed of:

Four Commissioners, representatives of four States of recognized impartiality and with a genuine interest in contributing to the resoluton of the Central American crisis, nominated by the Contadora Group and approved by the Parties;

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A Latin American Executive Secretary nominated by the Contadora Group and approved by the Parties by consensus, who shall ensure the daily operation of the commission.

(b) Operation

For the performance of its duties the Commission shall have an International Inspectorate provided by the States members of the Commission and coordinated by a Director of Operations.

The duties of the International Inspectorate shall be established in the bylaws of the Commission.

To assist it in the performance of its duties, the Commission shall have a group of consultants composed of a representative of each Central American State.

The Commission may invite a representative of the United Nations Secretary General and another representative of the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to participate in its meetings as observers.

The Commission may establish auxiliary bodies and receive assistance from existing joint commissions.

(c) Duties of the Commission

The Commission shall have the duty of ensuring fulfillment of the commitments undertaken in security matters. To this end it shall:

Verify fulfillment of the commitments concerning military maneuvers contained in this Act;

Verify that no war materiel is acquired and that military strenght is not increased, as established in Chapter III(19)(a) of this Act.

Verify that the Parties are fully observing the maximum limits previously established for the various categories of arms, military installations, and men under arms, and that they are complying with the reduction timetables agreed upon.

Verify that all acquisitions of weapons, spare parts, and replacement equipment are made in compliance with the inventories and registries previously established and with the agreed limits.

Verify that no new arms are introduced that qualitatively or quantitatively change the current inventories and that no weapons banned by this Act are introduced or utilized.

Establish a register of all commercial arms transactions by the Parties, including donations and other transfers made within the framework of military assistance agreements with other governments.

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Receive the list of foreign military bases, schools, and installations and verify their dismantling as established in this Act.

Receive the count of foreign military advisers and verify their withdrawal according to the agreed timetable.

Verify compliance with this Act concerning trafficking in arms and examine any reports of violations. To this end the following criteria may be considered:

(1) Origin of the trafficking in arms: the port or airport of embarkation of the arms, munitions, equipment, and other categories of military supplies intended for the Central American region.

(2) Personnel involved: persons, groups, or organizations that have participated in the coordination and the commission of trafficking in arms, including participation by governments or their represenatives.

(3) Type of arms, munitions, equipment, and other categories of military supplies: type of arms and caliber, country of manufacture, country of origin, and the number of each type of arms, munitions, equipment, and other categories of military supplies.

(4) Means of transportation outside the region: land, sea, or air, including nationality.

(5) Extraregional transportation routes: traffic routes used, including ports of call or intermediate destination.

(6) Storage places of arms, munitions, equipment, and other types of military supplies.

(7) Intraregional traffic areas and routes: description of areas and routes, participation of governmental or other sectors in arms trafficking, frequency of use of these areas and routes.

(8) Intraregional means of transportation: determination of means of transportation used, owners of such means, the facilities provided by the government or governmental or other sectors, or other means of delivery.

(9) Receiving unit or destination: determination of the persons, groups, and organizations who are the intended recipients of the arms traffic.

Verify compliance with this Act concerning irregular forces and nonuse of their own territories for destablizing activities against any other State and examine any reports of violations. To do so it shall consider the following criteria:

(1) Installations, means, bases, camps, or facilities for logistical and operational support

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of irregular forces, including command, radio communications, and radio broadcasting centers.

(2) Determination of propaganda activities or political, physical, economic, or military support for activities directed against any State in the region.

(3) Identification of persons, groups, and governmental sectors involved in such activities.

Verify fulfillment of the commitments concerning terrorism, subversion, and sabotage established in this Act.

(d) Rules and Procedures

The Commission shall receive any duly substantiated report on violations of the security commitments undertaken in this Act, shall inform the Parties involved, and shall initiate the appropriate investigation.

In like manner, it shall be empowered to conduct any investigation it deems relevant on its own initiative.

The Commission shall conduct its investigations by means of on-site inspection, compiling evidence, and any other procedure it deems necessary to the performance of its functions.

In cases of reports of violation of or noncompliance with the commitments of this Act in security matters, the Commission shall prepare a report containing recommendations to the Parties concerned.

The Commission will receive from the Parties their prompt and full cooperation and assistance in the proper performance of its functions. In like manner, it shall ensure the confidentiality of any information collected or received in the course of the investigation.

The Commission shall send its reports and recommendations confidentially to the Parties and to the governments of the Contadora Group. They may be made public when the Commission considers that it would contribute to the complete fulfillment of the commitments contained in the Act.

(d) Bylaws

Once established, the Commission shall establish its own bylaws in consultation with the Parties.

(e) Term of office of the Commissioners

Representatives of the member States of the Commission shall serve for an initial term of two years, which may be extended by mutual agreement between the Parties and the member States.

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(f) Installation

The Commission shall be installed upon signature of the Act.

C. Comite ad hoc para la Evaluacion y el Seguimiento de los Compromisos en Materia Economica y Social [Ad Hoc Committee for the Evaluation and Follow-up of Commitments in Economic and Social Affairs]

(a) Membership

For the purposes of this Act, the meeting of Ministers of Economy of Central America shall constitute the Ad Hoc Committee for the Evaluation and Follow-up of Commitments in Economic and Social Affairs.

(b) Functions

The Committee shall receive reports by the Parties concerning their progress in complying with the economic and social commitments.

The Committee shall conduct periodic evaluation of progress in complying with economic and social commitments, relying on the information furnished by the Parties and the competent international and regional organizations.

The Committee shall present proposals in its periodic reports to srengthen regional cooperation and promote development plans, with particular emphasis on the aspects indicated in the commitments of this Act.

4. Financing the Implementation and Follow-Up Mechanisms:

(a) The implementation and follow-up mechanisms referred to in Part II of this Act shall be financed by a Fund for Peace in Central America.

(b) The resources for these funds shall be derived from equal contributions by the Parties and by additional contributions obtained from other States, international organizations, or other sources, which may be managed by the Central American States with cooperation from the Contadora Group.

Part III—Final Provisions

1. The commitments undertaken by the Parties in this Act and its Annex(es) are legal in nature and therefore binding.

2. This Act shall be ratified in conformity with the constitutional procedures established in each of the Central American States. Each signatory State will deposit its instrument of ratification with the Secretary General of the United Nations and with the Secretary General of the Organization of American States.

3. This Act shall enter into force eight days after the fifth instrument of ratification has been deposited.

4. After the date of signature, the Parties will abstain from acts which frustrate the object and purpose of this Act and will seek in good faith to take pertinent individual or joint actions to guarantee

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the immediate application of the commitments which require such actions in order to preserve and attain said object and purpose.

5. When this Act has been signed, the merchanisms referred to in Part II hereof shall operate provisionally. The Parties will take such measures as may be necessary to guarantee such provisional operation.

6. Any dispute regarding the interpretation or application of this Act that cannot be resolved through the mechanisms provided in Part II shall be submitted to the Ministers of Foreign Relations of the Parties for their consideration and decision, by unanimity.

7. In the event that the dispute persists and upon request by any of the Parties, the Ministers of Foreign Relations of the States composing the Contadora Group shall use their good offices so that the Parties concerned may resolve that dispute. If that recourse fails, they may suggest another peaceful means of resolving the dispute in conformity with Article 33 of the United Nations Charter and Article 24 of the Charter of the Organization of American States.

If 30 days elapse without an agreement by the Parties concerning the implementation of the procedure suggested, any of them may make public the decisions, reports, or recommendations regarding the dispute made by the mechanisms for execution and follow-up provided for in Part II hereof.

8. There shall be no reservations to this Act.

9. The Annex(es) and Additional Protocols I through IV are an integral part of this Act.

10. Five years after the entry into force of this Act, the States party to it and the Contadora Group shall meet in order to evaluate it and take any measures they deem appropriate.

11. This Act shall be registered by the Parties with the Secretary General of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

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ANNEX

The Parties have agreed on the following definitions of military terms:

1. Register: Numerical or graphic information on military, paramilitary, and security personnel strength and military installations.

2. Inventory: Detailed report of foreign- or nationally-owned weapons and military equipment with the maximum specifications possible.

3. Count: Number of foreign military or civilian personnel acting as advisers in defense and/or security matters.

4. Military installation: Establishment or infrastructure including airports, barracks, strongholds, camps, air, naval, or similar installations under military jurisdiction, including their geographical location.

5. Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE): Document containing the mission, organization, equipment capabilities and limitations of a standard military unit at its different levels.

6. Military equipment: Nationally- or foreign-owned material, as used individual articles or in combination by a military force for its elite and operation, excluding weapons.

7. Classification of weapons:

(a) By type:
1. Conventional
2. Chemical
3. Biological
4. Radiological

(b) By range:
1. Short: Individual and group-portable weapons.
2. Medium: Non-portable support weapons (mortars, bazookas, and cannons).
3. Long: Rockets and guided missiles, which in turn may be divided into:
a. Short-range rockets: their maximum range is less than 20 kilometers.
b. Long-range rockets: their maximum range is 20 kilometers or more.
c. Short-range guided missiles: their maximum range is up to 100 kilometers.
d. Medium-range guided missiles: their range is between 100 kilometers and 500 kilometers.
e. Long-range guided missiles: their range is 500 kilometers and more.

(c) By caliber and weight:
1. Light: 120 mm or less.
2. Medium: More than 120 mm and less than 160 mm.
3. Heavy: More than 160 mm and less than 210 mm.
4. Very heavy: More than 210 mm.

(d) By trajectory:
1. Flat trajectory weapons.
2. Curved trajectory weapons.
a. Mortars
b. Bazookas

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c. Cannons
d. Rockets

(e) By means of transport:
1. Foot
2. Horse-drawn
3. Towed
4. Self-propelled
5. All weapons can be transported by road, train, ship, or air.
6. The weapons transported by air may be classified as follows:
a. Carried by helicopter
b. Carried by aircraft

8. Features to be considered in the various types of aircraft and helicopters:
a. Model
b. Quantity
c. Crew
d. Manufacturer
e. Speed
f. Capability
g. Propulsion system
h. Armed with artillery or not
i. Type of weapons
j. Operating range
k. Navigation system
l. Communication system
m. Type of mission

9. Features to be considered in the various vessels:
a. Type of vessel
b. Shipyard and year of manufacture
c. Tonnage
d. Displacement
e. Draft
f. Length
g. Propulsion system
h. Type of weapons and firing system
i. Crew

10. Services: Logistical and administrative bodies of general support to the military, paramilitary, and security forces.

11. Military education centers: Installations for training military personnel in their various ranks and areas of specialization.

12. Military base: Land, marine, and air space that includes military installations, personnel, and military equipment under a military command. The definition of foreign military base should take the following factors into account:
Its administration and control
Sources of financing
Percentages of local and foreign personnel
Bilateral agreements
Its location and geographical area
Transfer of part of territory to another State
Number of personnel.

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13. Foreign military installations: Installations that were built to be used by foreign units for maneuvers, training, or other military objectives, according to bilateral agreements. These installations may be temporary or permanent.

14. Foreign military advisers: Military and security advisers means foreign military or civilian personnel who are performing technical, training, or advisory functions in the following areas of operation: tactics, logistics, strategy, organization, and security in the army, navy, air force, or security forces in the Central American States under agreements established with one or several governments.

15. Arms traffic: Arms traffic means any type of transfer by governments, individuals, or regional or extraregional groups of weapons intended for groups, irregular forces, or armed bands seeking to destabilize governments of the region. It also includes the passage of such traffic through the territory of a third State, with or without its consent, to the aforementioned groups in another State.

16. National military maneuvers: These are exercises or simulations of combat or warfare that troops conduct in peacetime for training. The armed forces of the country participate in their own territory, and the exercises may include army, navy, and air force units, in order to increase their operational ability.

17. International military maneuvers: All those operations conducted by the armed forces of two or more countries in one of their territories or in an international zone, including army, navy, and air force units, in order to increase their operational ability and develop measures of joint coordination.

18. The inventories prepared in each State, separately for each of their armed forces, covering personnel, weapons and ammunition, equipment, and installations of the forces shown below, according to their own organizational structures:

(a) Security forces:
1. Border guards
2. Urban and rural guards
3. Military forces assigned to other ministries
4. Public security force
5. Training center
6. Other.

(b) Naval forces:
1. Location
2. Type of base
3. Number and characteristics of the fleet. Type of weapons
4. Defense system. Type of weapons.
5. Communications systems
6. War materiel services
7. Air or ground transportation services
8. Health services
9. Maintenance services
10. Supply services
11. Recruitment and length of service
12. Training center
13. Other.

(c) Air Force

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1. Location
2. Runway capability
3. Number and characteristics of the air fleet. Type of weapons.
4. Defense system. Type of weapons.
5. Communication system
6. War materiel services
7. Health services
8. Ground transportation services
9. Training centers
10. Maintenance centers
11. Supply services
12. Recruitment and length of service
13. Other.

(d) Army

1. Infantry
2. Motorized infantry
3. Airborne infantry
4. Cavalry
5. Artillery
6. Armored
7. Signal Corps
8. Engineers
9. Special troops
10. Reconnaissance troops
11. Health services
12. Transportation services
13. War materiel services
14. Maintenance services
15. Supply services
16. Military police
17. Training center
18. This document should include precise information about the induction system, recruitment, and length of service.
19. Other.

(e) Paramilitary forces

(f) Request for information concerning airports:

Existing airfields:

1. Detailed location and classification
2. Location of installations
3. Dimensions of runways and taxiways and maintenance stands.
4. Resources: Buildings, maintenance installations, fuel supply, aids to navigation, communication systems.

(g) Request for information concerning terminals and ports:

1. Location and general features
2. Entrance and access channels
3. Breakwaters
4. Terminal capacity.

(h) Personnel: From the viewpoint of personnel, the number of personnel on active duty, in the reserve, in the security forces and paramilitary organizations is required; in like manner, the information on advisers should include their

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number, immigration status, area of specialization, nationality and length of stay in the country, and agreements or contacts as the case may be.

(i) With respect to weapons, all kinds of ammunition should be included, explosives, ammunition for portable weapons, artillery, bombs and torpedos, rockets, hand and rifle grenades, depth charges, land and naval mines, detonators, grenades for mortars and bazookas, etc, should be included.

(j) In national and foreign military installations, include hospitals and military first aid stations, naval bases, airports, and landing strips.

ANNEX I—ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I TO THE CONTADORA ACT FOR PEACE AND COOPERATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA

The governments of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela, desirous of continuing to help achieve the goals of peace and cooperation in Central America contained in the Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America,

Have agreed as follows:

1. To cooprate with the Central American States in achieving the purpose and objective of the Act.

2. To lend full support to the establishment and operation of the implementation and follow-up mechanisms provided for in the Act.

3. To contribute to the peaceful settlement of disputes that may arise in the application and interpretation of the Act, in accordance with the provisions of Part III thereof.

4. No reservations may be made to this protocol.

5. This Protocol shall enter into force for each signatory State on the date of deposit of its respective instrument of ratification, which must be deposited simultaneously with the Secretariat of the United Nations and the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States.

6. This Protocol shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

In witness whereof, the undersigned plenipotentiaries, duly authorized by their respective Govenments, have signed this Protocol in the city of on , 1985.

For the Government of the Republic of Colombia:
For the Government of the Republic of Panama:
For the Government of the United Mexican States:
For the Government of the Republic of Venezuela:

ANNEX II—ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II TO THE CONTADORA ACT FOR PEACE AND COOPERATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA

The undersigned plenipotentiaries, representatives of States of the Americas, provided with full powers by their respective governments,

Convinced of the need to have the effective cooperation of the States of the Americas in order to ensure the force, effectiveness,

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and viability of the Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America,

Have agreed as follows:

1. To refrain from acts that frustrate the purpose and objective of the Act.

2. To cooperate with the Central American States in achieving the purpose and objective of the Act.

3. To lend their full support to the performance of the functions of the implementation and follow-up mechanisms provided for in the Act when such support is required by the parties.

4. No reservations may be made to this protocol.

5. This Protocol shall be open for signature by all States of the Americas.

6. This Protocol shall enter into force for each signatory State on the date of deposit of its respective instrument of ratification with the Secretariat of the United Nations or the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States.

7. This Protocol shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

This protocol, and its Spanish, English, French, and Portuguese texts are equally authentic [sic], shall be opened for signature in the city of on , 1985, and, after that date, at the United Nations Secretariat.

For the Government of :
For the Government of :
For the Government of :

ANNEX III—ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL III TO THE CONTADORA ACT FOR PEACE AND COOPERATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA

The undersigned plenipotentiaries of their respective governments, provided with full powers,

Convinced of the need to have the effective cooperation of the international community in order to ensure the force, effectiveness, and viability of the Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America,

Have agreed as follows:

1. To respect the commitments undertaken by the Central American Governments.

2. To refrain from any acts that frustrate the purpose and objective of the Act.

3. To cooperate, insofar as possible, with the Central American States for the economic and social development of the region.

4. No reservations may be made to this protocol.

5. This Protocol shall be open for signature by all States wishing to contribute to peace and cooperation in Central America.

6. This Protocol shall enter into force for each signatory State on the date of deposit of its respective instrument of ratification with the Secretariat of the United Nations.

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7. This Protocol shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

This protocol, whose texts in the official languages of the United Nations are equally authentic, shall be open for signature at the United Nations Secretariat in the city of New York.

For the Government of :
For the Government of :
For the Government of :

ANNEX IV—ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL IV TO THE CONTADORA ACT FOR PEACE AND COOPERATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA

The undersigned plenipotentiaries, provided with full powers of their respective governments:

Convinced that it is necessary to contribute to guaranteeing the fulfillment of the commitment undertaken in the Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America,

Have agreed:

1. To accept the invitation to participate and cooperate in the establishment and the operation of the implementation and follow-up mechanisms provided for in the Act, in the terms agreed to with the Parties in agreements which should be annexed to this Protocol.

2. To act with complete impartiality in the fulfillment of the functions of implementation and follow-up in which they participate.

3. This Protocol will be open to signature by the States proposed by the Group of Contadora and agreed upon by the Parties by common agreement.

4. This Protocol shall enter into force for each signatory State on the date of deposit of its respective instrument of ratification with the United Nations Secretariat.

5. No reservations may be made to this protocol.

6. This Protocol shall be registered with the United Nations secretariat in accordance with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

This protocol, whose texts in the official languages of the United Nations are equally authentic, shall be open for signature at the United Nations Secretariat in the city of New York.

For the Government of :
For the Government of :
For the Government of :

THE CARABALLEDA MESSAGE TOWARD CENTRAL AMERICA'S PEACE, SECURITY, AND DEMOCRACY

The Ministers of Foreign Relations of the Contadora Group and the Group of Support to Contadora, who met in Caraballeda on January 11 and 12, 1986, express hereby that owing to the growing threats to peace in Central America and because of the possible risk of cessation of diplomatic action which would exacerbate tensions in the region, it has become urgent and necessary to encourage with renewed vigor the negotiation process fostered by the Con-

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tadora Group. This negotiation process must result in the prompt signing of Contadora's Act for Peace and Cooperation, considered as the only means of having an instrument of general political understanding which would allow the respectful, peaceful, and productive coexistence of all countries in the region. The Ministers have confirmed that, after 36 months of negotiations, there are still attitudes and situations making difficult a general and comprehensive agreement necessary to overcome the climate of hostility, and put a stop to the arms race, foreign intervention, and policies of violence. Consequently, and in order to recover the necessary climate of trust to ensure the respect of the political will of the parties in the signing of Contadora's Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America, the Ministers are planning to:

(a) Define the permanent bases for peace in Central America.

(b) Specify the necessary actions to ensure the observance of these bases.

(c) To immediately carry out the diplomatic actions required to obtain the explicit acceptance of the bases and actions by all parties, whether involved directly or indirectly.

(d) to offer its mediation in any other actions to be undertaken.

(e) to carry out relevant tasks in expediting the signing and putting into effect of Contadora's Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America.

1. Permanent bases for peace in Central America

Any permanent solution to the Central American conflict must have fair and balanced bases, which will express traditional values and the desire of the Latin American peoples for civilized coexistence. It is for this reason that the Ministers of the Contadora Group and of the Group of Support have determined the following permanent bases for Peace in Central America:

1. A Latin American solution.—Meaning that the solution to the Latin American problems must come from, and receive the support of, the region itself, so that it will not be included in the East-West world strategic conflict.

2. Self determination.—Meaning the independence of each of the Latin American countries to determine its own form of social and political organization, establishing at a domestic level the type of government which is freely chosen by the entire population.

3. Non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States.—Which means that no country will be able to influence, directly or by acting indirectly through a third party, the political situation of the Latin American states, or in any way affect their sovereignty.

4. Territorial integrity.—Meaning the recognition of ranges of action for each of the countries, within which each country can exercise its sovereignty and outside which the country must observe a strict compliance with the norms of international law.

5. Pluralistic democracy.—Meaning the right to universal suffrage by free and periodical elections, supervised by independent national organizations: a multiparty system that will allow the legal and organized representation of all kinds of political action and thought. A government of the majority, ensuring the basic lib-

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erties and rights of all citizens and the respect of all political minorities according to the society's constitutional order.

6. Non-presence of weapons or military bases which present a threat to peace and security.

7. No-undertaking of military actions by the countries in the region or with ties in the region, which may present a threat for the region and its peace.

8. Non-presence of foreign troops or advisers

9. No political, logistic, or military support to any group intending to subvert or destabilize the constitutional order of any Latin American state through force or terrorist acts of any kind.

10. Observance of human rights.—Meaning the unrestricted defense of civil, political and religious liberties, thus ensuring the complete material and spiritual fulfillment of all citizens.

2. Actions to ensure the observance of the permanent bases for peace

In order to effectively obtain the permanent bases for peace, it is necessary to create a climate of mutual trust, which will rebuild the spirit of negotiation and translate political will into the actual support of the bases established in order to reach the final objective of the signing and making effective Contadora's Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America.

For this purpose, it will be necessary to make the following actions a priority:

(1) To renew and conclude the negotiations leading to the signing of Contadora's Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America.

(2) Termination of external support to the irregular forces operating in the region.

(3) Termination of support to insurrectionist movements in all countries of the region.

(4) Freezing of the purchase of weapons and their organized distribution.

(5) Suspension of international military maneuvers.

(6) Progressive reduction, towards total elimination, of the presence of foreign military advisors and foreign military installations in the area.

(7) Commitment by the five Central American countries, through unilateral statements, to avoid aggression.

(8) Effective steps towards obtaining national reconcilation, and the total observance of human rights and individual liberties.

(9) To promote regional and international cooperation, so as to ameliorate the pressing economic and social problems which afflict the Central American region.

The Ministers are agreed in the opinion that, in order to attain the proposed objective, and to create mutual trust, it is indispensable that these initiatives be taken simultaneously.

3. Support to the permanent bases for peace and specific actions

The Contadora Group countries agree to initiate, with the necessary collaboration from the Group of Support, immediate diplomatic actions directed to obtain explicit support for these bases and actions from the five Central American countries and other members

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of the international community (particularly the rest of the American continent) interested in achieving peace in the region.

4. Mediation

The member countries of the Contadora Group, with the assistance of the Group of Support, offer their mediation for the purpose of facilitating the development of the following actions.

(1) To promote new actions of national reconciliation, according to the current legal framework of each of the countries, since regional stability also implies the need for internal peace in those countries who have experienced deep social divisions.

(2) To accept the proposal of the President Elect of Guatemala to initiate a process of consultations among the Central American legislative bodies regarding conditions in the Region, so as to create a regional parliament. This could contribute to a better understanding of problems in the area and to strengthen efforts towards negotiation.

(3) To encourage the re-establishment of conversations between the Governments of the United States and Nicaragua, in order to settle their differences and to identify possible forms of agreement. A respectful negotiation, which will take into account the need for mutual and equitable concessions, is the condition necessary to reduce regional tension.

The dialogue of Manzanillo served to identify the requirements for a feasible negotiation which should not be further delayed to avoid presenting a grave risk to Latin America's peace and stability. The obstacles which have stood in the way of this dialogue can be lifted by the political will and flexibility of both parties.

5. Signing of the act and its becoming effective

The eight Ministers have decided to make every effort to speed the negotiations leading to the prompt signing of Contadora's Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America, and its becoming effective.

Caraballeda, January 12, 1986.

DECLARATION OF GUATEMALA

[Text] The foreign relations ministers of Central America, meeting in Guatemala City on the occasion of the inauguration of President Vinicio Cerezo, and after holding a working meeting with the foreign ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela, members of the Contadora Group, and with the foreign ministers of Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay, members of the Support Group, issue the following Guatemala Declaration:

1. The ministers of foreign relations of Central America, who are meeting for the first time with the foreign relations ministers of the Contadora and Support Groups, during an occasion deemed to be of major importance to the overall peace process in the region, have received from the ministers of eight Latin American countries the Carabellada document for peace, security, and democracy in Central America.

2. Upon studying the Caraballeda document for Central American peace, security, and democracy, the foreign ministers of Cen-

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tral America have agreed to express our adherence to the principles and purposes contained therein, reiterating our countries' commitment to achieve peace and stability through the Contadora document for peace and cooperation in Central America.

We feel that by expressing our adherence to the initiatives and proposals contained in the Caraballeda document, the climate of mutual trust that will permit reaching peace and cooperation in Central America will be generated.

3. The foreign relations ministers of Central America feel, and so acknowledge it, that the meeting of 13 Latin American representatives held in Guatemala City, as the means to find solutions for the region's problems, is an auspicious event that will contribute to consolidating the democratic future of all our countries.

We sign this declaration in Guatemala City, on 14th of January of 1986, the International Year of Peace.

Signed by the five Central American foreign ministers, in support of the Caraballeda document.

COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE CONTADORA GROUP AND THE GROUP OF SUPPORT AFTER MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ

The ministers of foreign affairs of the Contadora group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela) and of the group of support (Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay) met today with the U.S. Secretary of State, George P. Shultz, in an attempt to encourage Contadora's process of negotiation and begin undertaking the actions set forth in "the Caraballeda Message" within the context of the dialogue which the eight Latin American governments have decided to maintain with all parties involved in the Central American conflict.

This message—representing a Latin American initiative towards peace, security, and the strengthening of democracy in Central America—proposes the following essential measures for their immediate implementation:

The renewal of negotiations leading to the endorsement of Contadora's act for peace and cooperation in Central America.

The cessation of support to irregular forces operating within the region.

The cessation of support to insurrectional movements in all countries of the region.

A freeze in the procurement of armament and their progressive reduction.

The end of international military maneuvers.

The progressive reduction, leading to a complete removal, of foreign military advisors and foreign military installations.

A non-aggression commitment made by each of the five Central American countries through unilateral statements.

The adoption of purposeful steps leading to national reconciliation and the full observance of human rights and civil liberties.

To promote regional and international cooperation, in order to reduce the pressing economic and social problems affecting the Central American region.

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This initiative was endorsed by all Central American governments in Guatemala, on January 14, 1986, and has the explicit support of the members of the European economic community and of the international community in general.

In their meeting with Secretary Shultz, the Latin American foreign ministries underlined the need for the above actions to be urgently undertaken, and for progress to be made regarding each of these actions in a simultaneous manner. In this regard it was restated that the end of external support to irregular forces operating in the area is an indispensable contribution to peace. It was also mentioned as imperative the need to adopt effective measures of national reconciliation in all situations where there have been deep divisions within the social fabric.

The ministers affirmed that regional security and stability require the observance of what eight Latin American democracies defined in Caraballeda as permanent bases for peace. That is: a Latin American solution, self-determination, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, territorial integrity, pluralistic democracy, non-presence of weapons or military bases, not undertaking acts of aggression, non-presence of foreign troops or advisors, non-support of subversive groups, and the respect of human rights.

The ministers also expressed their firm decision to continue negotiations leading to the achievement of a peaceful solution to the regional crisis, with the parties directly involved in the Central American conflict, and with countries with ties and interests in the region.

Meeting in a climate of frankness, the Latin American foreign ministers and U.S. Secretary of State Shultz coincided completely in that the solution to the Central American crisis must be found within political channels and through negotiations.

Washington, D.C., February 10, 1986.

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